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WEST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

ARMS CONTROL

DENMARK

Disarmament Movement Takes Up Fight Against Dyvig Report (Jørgen Dragsdahl; INFORMATION, 7 Dec 84)	1
Dissension in Peace Movement Over Group's Suppression in East (Peter Fergen; AKTUELT, 10 Dec 84)	6
'Peace Fund' Dissappointed as Economic Support Lags (George Hilton; INFORMATION, 10 Dec 84)	8

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Deterrence May Be in Conflict With International Law (Rolf Zundel; DIE ZEIT, 7 Dec 84)	10
---	----

SWEDEN

Foreign Ministry Issues Book Stating Position on 'Zone' (Lars Christiansson; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 16 Nov 84)	17
Bildt Attacks Government's Campaign for UN Nuclear Freeze (Carl Bildt; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 4 Dec 84)	19
Conservative Paper Examines Role of Palme Commission (Editorial; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 4 Dec 84)	24

POLITICAL

DENMARK

PLO Office in Copenhagen Acceptable (Dax; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 29 Dec 84)	26
---	----

DENMARK/GREENLAND

Minister Sees 'Tense' Year Ahead for Greenland (BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 31 Dec 84)	27
Greenland Growing Increasingly Frustrated With EC (Editorial; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 29 Dec 84)	28

GREECE

Presidential Elections Continue to Fuel Commentary (Various sources, various dates)	29
Significant Papandreou-Karamanlis Meetings, Editorial Importance of Karamanlis Election, by K. Bousbourelis Prolonged Silence Seen Harmful Destabilization Attempt Seen Possible Government Involvement, Editorial	
Pros, Cons of Simple, Reinforced Proportional Electoral Systems (G. V. Xanthakis; I KATHIMERINI, 2-3 Dec 84)	35
Left Seen Ambivalent on Karamanlis' Election (ENA, 20 Dec 84)	41
'Secret' Document on PASOK Reliance on Anti-Americanism (MESIMVRINI, 19 Dec 84)	43
Tikhonov Visit to Turkey Blow to PASOK (I KATHIMERINI, 28 Dec 84)	45
PASOK Plans 'Anti-Right Groupings' (ENA, 22 Nov 84; ELEFTHERTOTYPIA, 20 Nov 84)	47
Division in Top Leadership Overtures to Center, by Viktor Netas	
Personalities Mentioned as Possible Karamanlis' Successors (ENA, 22 Nov 84)	49
RIXI Members Interviewed: All Revolutionary Methods Acceptable (Giorgos Tringas; ENA, 20 Dec 84)	52

NORWAY

Conservatives Confident on Election Year Five (AFTENPOSTEN, various dates)	56
Membership Growth Larger than Labor's, by Terje Svabo Scholar: Conservative Wave Continuing, by Bjorn Talen Progressives May Take Votes, Henry Valen Interview Greater Labor Voter Stability Election of 'Clear Political Alternatives', by Egil Sundar	

MILITARY

DENMARK

- Major Cites Shortcomings in Armed Forces Materiel
(J. J. Graabaek; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 29 Dec 84) 67

SWEDEN

- Ambassador Theorin Seen Victor in Arms Export Policy Fight
(Editorial; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 20 Nov 84) 71

ECONOMIC

GREECE

- OECD Sees Inflation Drop, Unemployment Rise in 1985
(I KATHIMERINI, 21 Dec 84) 74

ENERGY

AUSTRIA

- More Electricity, Less Total Energy Consumed
(Walter Fremuth; DIE PRESSF, 28 Nov 84) 76

DENMARK

- Minister Concedes Nuclear Power for Country Is Dead Issue
(Various sources, various dates) 79

Report Seen Premature, Editorial
Safety Concerns Paramount
Coal Seen Economically Preferable, by John Wagner
Minister: Parliament Against Nuclear Power, by
Christian Christensen

- Country Expected To Get Fourth of Energy Needs From North Sea
(BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 13 Dec 84; AKTUEL, 16 Dec 84) 86

Declining Consumption Positive Factor, by Dan Axél
Full Production Expected Soon, by Vagn Petersen

Briefs

- New Natural Gas Monopoly 89

DISARMAMENT MOVEMENT TAKES UP FIGHT AGAINST DYVIG REPORT

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 7 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Jørgen Dragsdahl: "Disarmament Movement Takes Up Fight Against Dyvig Report; Quick Counter-Report from 'No to Nuclear Weapons' and Book with Analysis of Social Democratic Party"]

[Text] The disarmament movement's fear of the consequences of the Dyvig Report has brought about a counter-play which is evident already a week after publication of the officials' work.

The organization No to Nuclear Weapons has just published a 32-page commentary on the report itself, and in the next few days a book will come from the Eirene publishing firm, which is also a kind of counter-report, in that the spotlight is placed on the Social Democratic Party's security policy, with the obvious purpose of holding the party to its viewpoints and developing it in a more radical direction.

The report from the Dyvig Committee will be first generally available to the public in February, when the government's security policy committee, the SNU, will publish it. To begin with the work was printed in a very limited edition, which was sent out to politicians and those specially interested, and the Foreign Affairs Ministry reports that it is all sold out now. As far as INFORMATION has learned, circles in the disarmament movement will publish pirated editions of the Dyvig Report if earlier publication does not take place, as they would like from the outset to influence through the public debate the politicians who are to take a stand on the report in a special committee.

Polished Report

No to Nuclear Weapons calls the Dyvig Report "a skillfully rendered well balanced account of the official security policy world picture."

But it is not satisfactory, as the nuclear buildup and the confrontation between the superpowers "are confronting us with other more important tasks than summarizing existing knowledge in polished form." It is believed that precisely those problems which the disarmament movements and large sectors of the public consider important have either not been discussed or this was done

quite superficially. "It can perhaps be asserted that it is this superficiality which is the basis of the report's elegant elaboration," it reads.

The report is commented on chapter by chapter.

No to Nuclear Weapons criticizes the fact that in the account of Denmark's admission to NATO the historical research of the last 20 years was ignored, which has shown that Denmark's possibilities were more open and that the Danes' notions regarding NATO's interest in Denmark differed from the American and British, who were especially interested in Greenland's strategic position. That the problem area concerning the Danish straits has not changed since the First World War is rejected. Blocking of the Soviet navy's exit possibilities is today a subject which has shifted to the area between North Norway and Iceland.

Danish Powerlessness

It is emphasized in the Dyvig Report that Denmark's influence in NATO is in the political area. But according to No to Nuclear Weapons this means that Denmark has very little influence, because the existence of nuclear weapons means that "concrete military strategy actions carry greater weight than political statements of intentions." It is mentioned, for example, that in spite of Danish intentions it has not been possible to keep Scandinavia as a low-tension area.

The Dyvig Report places great emphasis on the fact that NATO has been a driving force in relaxation of tensions, since the alliance has aimed at a balance between military strength and detente. But the counter-report rejects this viewpoint, which is allegedly historically incorrect, as Brandt's Ostpolitik and the SALT process have played a far greater role.

Decisive Weak Point

The discussion of the threat from military technological developments in the area of nuclear weapons is strongly criticized, since in spite of reference to the importance of */determent/* [in italics] it is ignored that this is being undermined by new weapons.

The lacking discussion of the consequences is "a decisive weak point in the Dyvig Report," it reads, and continues:

"It is easy to reject all ideas for disarmament measures because they do not provide absolute security, if it is implied that the alternative is the status quo--the safe thing in the familiar meaning. If the alternative--continuation of the present development--is still more insecure, then the discussion of the new controversial proposals will be far more realistic, difficult and valuable."

The Dyvig Committee cautions against Denmark's going it alone in criticism of, for example, the talks in Geneva and the missile buildup in Europe, since

there is the risk of then not being heard. But Denmark is not going it along, No to Nuclear Weapons writes, since public opinion in all European countries shares the Danish viewpoints which the Folketing pushed through.

The Dyvig Report's arguments against isolated Danish freedom from nuclear weapons and the establishment of a Scandinavian nuclear-weapons-free zone are rejected in detail.

It is acknowledged that Denmark's freedom from nuclear weapons is at variance with NATO's strategy, but in contrast to the Dyvig Committee nothing unsolidary is seen in a Danish no to nuclear weapons. The desire is that this initiative is to be "a contribution to a process toward /European/ [in italics] freedom from nuclear weapons." It is also denied that reinforcement of the Danish armed forces from outside will be a more problematic matter: "We will get the reinforcements which on NATO's part are judged to be appropriate for delivery as an element of the overall strategy."

The Dyvig Committee points out that Denmark's freedom from nuclear weapons is not a guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons against Denmark. "No, Denmark's freedom from nuclear weapons does /not/ [in italics] have the aim of keeping Denmark free from mushroom clouds in a European major war," No to Nuclear Weapons answers, which finds it "gratifying" that the report uses just a paragraph on repudiation of "this non-argument."

A Scandinavian nuclear-weapons-free zone must not be implemented in isolation, the Dyvig Report argues, which wants to see the zone in a larger European context. No to Nuclear Weapons believes that the committee's feeling is that Danish and Norwegian freedom from nuclear weapons ought not to take precedence over broader European measures. But "a Danish declaration of freedom from nuclear weapons or a Scandinavian zone have their justification /precisely/ [in italics] as aids for giving birth to other European measures. And it is for this reason of doubtful value after a process of detente and disarmament has begun." No to Nuclear Weapons thinks that the aversion to a Danish or Scandinavian initiative is due to the fact that it will have an effect in other countries.

No to Nuclear Weapons also finds it unjustifiable that the disarmament movement is referred to with respect but the specific proposals the movement has for how the technical problems concerning disarmament can be solved are not at all taken a position on. The Dyvig Committee just rattles these problems off.

Directed Against Social Democratic Party

An often repeated point in the criticism is that the Dyvig Committee does not take up the longterm security policy future. For this reason the report is not "a real security policy review." It is "only to fulfill an immediate political function: to get the Social Democratic Party in place in the security policy fold."

"First it is threatened that with possible Danish freedom from nuclear weapons we forfeit our opportunities to get reinforcements. Then comes the positive emphasis of all the opportunities Denmark has to influence NATO, all supplemented with specific examples of NATO's having listened to Denmark's voice on decisive occasions. But, of course, all under the assumption of alliance solidarity on Denmark's part!" it reads in conclusion. "The report's openings for the Social Democratic Party and the disarmament movements are in areas which precisely do not require independent Danish initiatives: This concerns both the first-use doctrine's reshaping into not-early first use, and the Palme plan for a nuclear-weapons-free corridor down through Europe, as well as the general declaration regarding forgoing the use of force, which is being discussed in Stockholm. And precisely out of regard for the report's immediate political function, the Dyvig Committee, in spite of an otherwise commendable openness will not recognize the difference between Danish sovereignty and Danish alliance solidarity. And this difference is perhaps Denmark's most important security problem."

Although the "counter-report" from the Eirene publishing firm, "There Is the Position," was written before the Dyvig Report was published, it contains both an answer to the indirect criticism of the Folketing's resolutions and an elaboration of points which the officials passed over lightly.

While the Dyvig Committee asserts that nothing new has taken place with regard to the assumptions of Denmark's security policy, which can be the cause of changing the traditional low Danish profile in NATO, a number of contributors argue that changes have taken place.

For political reasons, a contribution by Sven Auken, who is often given credit for appointment of the Dyvig Committee, is perhaps most noteworthy.

"The situation is, to put it most mildly, precarious for Europe: a greater buildup, greater insecurity and greater superpower control," he writes, and continues: "When you add to this the fact that the utmost decision for the time rests in the stiff-grown hands of old men, with politicians with an antiquated black-and-white picture of the world, it is obvious to anyone that the European states have a common interest in new initiatives. In this context the Social Democrats must have initiative, of course, but in reality it is a question of a common European interest across political boundaries: a vital interest across alliance boundaries and across differences in domestic policy opinions."

Auken does not want unity in the Folketing based on the traditional old ways of presenting the problem. He wants the government and the parliament to come into line in light of the */new/* problems of the time. "The non-socialist parties must join an active disarmament line in practice," he writes, and, on the other hand, the labor movement is to make it clear that "the goal is not and never has been to weaken the credibility of a Danish defense in cooperation with our allies."

Following in Footsteps

Kjeld Olesen, Lasse Budtz and David Jens Adler argue that the Social Democratic Party's new security policy profile is in good agreement with the legacy from Hedtoft, H.C. Hansen and Per Haekkerup.

Adler points out that it was Hedtoft who four years after Denmark's admission into NATO formulated the motto "For the Atlantic Pact--Against the Yes Men." H.C. Hansen was the father of the principle that there are not to be nuclear weapons on Danish soil under the present circumstances, which, according to Adler, for years got him many "rude expressions of contempt" from non-socialist politicians.

The argument that the young have forgotten April 9, Adler counters with the fact that Freedom Fighter Frode Jakobsen has been one of the strongest Social Democratic critics of the arms race.

The book contains an analysis of the Social Democrats' participation in the Scandilux coalition with other European labor parties, which undermines the allegations regarding Denmark's going it alone. From Norway, Anders Hellebust makes a contribution with an account of the compromise between the Labor Party and the government parties. Knud Damgaard describes his visions for the armed forces in the year 2001, and two journalists thoroughly examine NATO's planning of a more offensive strategy.

8985

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DISSENSION IN PEACE MOVEMENT OVER GROUP'S SUPPRESSION IN EAST

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 10 Dec 84 p 5

[Article by Peter Bergen: "Now There Is War in the Peace Movement; Intense Dispute Regarding Suppression of East European Peace Movement"]

[Text] "As a peace activist you sit back with an embarrassed manner after the fall's big peace demonstration, where a majority could not even be brought together to demand freedom for peace work in East Europe, /too/ [in italics]. One of the peace movement's critics is unfortunately all too right when he calls a situation like this one bad and rather embarrassing."

Kim Hundevadt in Århus, coeditor of No More Wars' periodical IKKEVOLD [NON-VIOLENCE], is not the only one in the Danish peace movements with this attitude. In several cities there have been internal clashes regarding the attitude toward the Soviet Union's buildup and the persecution of peace movements in East Europe.

Split

In Århus and Randers peace work has been split on this question. I Ålborg a split was avoided by the minority's yielding to the majority's opposition to the slogan "Freedom for Peace Work in the East and West."

This slogan resulted in the split in Århus, when communists and others would not accept it in preparation for the peace demonstration on 27 October.

On Tuesday a new peace group was formed in Randers after 16 resigned from the Randers Peace Group. A majority of this group maintained at a meeting on 20 November that, largely speaking, any criticism of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact's buildup must cease.

According to those who quit, this majority suddenly resulted from the fact that "a group of members in large numbers" turned up and expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the peace group criticized the Soviet Union.

Ammunition for Cold Warriors

The new peace group in Randers will continue to demand disarmament in both the East and West:

"We are afraid of nuclear weapons and war preparations, regardless of who is behind them. We will not support the Soviet Union's buildup by our silence and thereby give Uffe Ellemann Jensen and other cold warriors new ammunition by assuming an illogical position in our criticism."

"I think that those parties and groups which also want to talk about East Europe are thinking together. Other people and groups are careful of not saying too much in order not to step on the communists' toes and split the peace movement," says Kim Hundevadt from No More Wars, the country's oldest peace organization, which on pacifist grounds is against everything military.

The leading article in the last issue of AMK's [No More Wars'] IKKEVOLD does not shy away: "Peace activists who insist that support for independent peace groups in the East must be high up on the agenda are often accused of creating a split. The peace movement must keep peace in its own house, many say. But if the part of the peace movement which takes ideas like democracy and freedom seriously and which considers them to be bound closely up with the concept of 'peace' cannot be permitted to express our unqualified support for our true friends in East Europe no matter when, no matter where and with precisely the volume of sound which we find necessary, then 'peace in our own house' has been bought quite simply too expensively. Peace in a house in which the occupants air only those feelings which are well received by others is not the peace we must fight for."

8985

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'PEACE FUND' DISSAPPOINTED AS ECONOMIC SUPPORT LAGS

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 10 Dec 84 p 10

[Article by George Hilton: "Not Crazy About Financial Support for Peace Fund"]

[Text] The "Peace Fund" with Ritt Bjerregaard at its head has up to now collected 170,000 kroner. TV advertising in the fall produced no appreciable result. Previously the goal was 5 million kroner in a year, but the fund's founder, Niels Munk Plum, now dismisses this as "unrealistic."

Organizations seem to be turning their backs on the much discussed "Peace Fund" with Social Democrat Ritt Bjerregaard as its front figure.

The "Peace Fund" during the fall asked, among others, SiD [Semiskilled Workers' Union]—whose Chairman Hardy Hansen is among the fund's circle of friends—for financial support for peace work, but was refused for the present.

The fund's founder, Engineer Niels Munk Plum, tells BERLINGSKE TIDENDE:

"We sent petitions to organizations but we didn't get very much out of it. They have not been very willing."

To this SiD Chairman Hardy Hansen says:

"To begin with we said no to supporting the 'Peace Fund,' because we had enough to look after with, among other things, the peace conference at Christiansborg. We did not think we could take on more right now, but the petition has not been scrapped. It will certainly be taken up again at our executive committee's meeting in March."

The "Peace Fund" has up to now collected 170,000 kroner since the support group, the "Friends of the Peace Fund," was formed in February.

"The money has for the most part come in small portions. But we just received a promise of 100,000 kroner from an industry man, so if this comes through we will have plenty of money. I am very satisfied," Niels Munk Plum says.

Five Million Unrealistic

Originally the goal was to collect about a krone per Dane annually. Accordingly, at the founding of the circle of friends in February it was pointed out in the press that it "is the Peace Fund's goal to collect an amount of about 5 million kroner per year."

Today, nine months later, Niels Munk Plum says about the five million:

"This was not the goal we speculated on. This would certainly have been unrealistic. We at no point thought that every Dane would give a krone."

The "Peace Fund" on Saturday, 27 October, had an advertisement on TV before the "Television News," giving the fund's Giro number, but Niels Munk Plum says that the advertisement did not produce any appreciable financial gain.

"The TV advertisement was intended more as an image ad. I do not think it produced very much. But I do not think this indicates that we do not have support among the people."

The "Peace Fund" has received about 100 applications for financial support, and the executive committee will now evaluate the various projects. The fund has already granted 5000 kroner in support to the women's peace camp, which was set up near a NATO air-raid shelter near Ravnstrup in Central Jutland.

8985

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DETERRENCE MAY BE IN CONFLICT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 7 Dec 84 pp 9, 10

[Article by Rolf Zundel: "The FRG: A Western Guinea Pig ?"]

[Text] It is an image appropriate to the situation: the West German government, Horst Ehmke has said, is sitting on top of a time bomb and that bomb, of course, has been ticking away for some time now. Even former defense minister Apel was deeply concerned when he was first told about the problem. By now, a decision must be reached on it. What the problem is all about is the West German government's nuclear proviso at the ratification of the codicils to the 1948 Geneva Convention.

The Bonn government does not much like to talk about it. In fact, the politicians would rather the document remained buried underneath all the complicated legal opinions and secrecy regulations. But one man was so disturbed by the situation that he submitted a petition to the Bundestag to direct the politicians' attention to the issue. It was an extremely unusual step to take for a public official: Reinhard Schneider, the man who submitted the petition, is an expert in international law at the defense ministry. Now Schneider is no troublemaker, nor does he secretly sympathize with the peace movement's aims; he is a civil servant of more or less conservative leanings; a man with a great deal of experience.

Nor is this one of the usual administrative mishaps so common in Bonn. This particular case touches on issues which are normally considered taboo. For instance, it raises the question of whether NATO nuclear strategy is at all compatible with international law—or to put it more succinctly: whether the FRG must choose between international law and security through deterrence. It is one of those instances where reason (with a capital R) and political common sense lose their way in a labyrinth of substantive constraints.

We first got into the labyrinth for the best of intentions. Between 1974 and 1977, a conference was held in Geneva with the aim of amplifying on the humanitarian aspects of the law of war. The conference participants agreed on two codicils to the 1949 Geneva Red Cross Convention. The first of these provides for the rules of conduct in warfare and deals with the

protection of the civilian population and the environment. Among other things, that particular section of the protocol bans so-called "indiscriminate attacks which may be expected to cause casualties among the civilian population which are in no way commensurate to any immediate or anticipated military gains." The protocol contains some re-statements and some expanded versions of existing international law.

Nothing would seem to be more reasonable than to ratify these provisions post haste and without reservations—as NATO members Norway and Denmark have already done. After all, the FRG also agreed—along with all the other NATO countries—to the provisions contained in UN Resolution 2444 which also calls for the ban on indiscriminate warfare for the protection of the civilian population. In addition, the FRG has stated officially that NATO has no plans for "operations directed against the provisions of international law."

Nonetheless, the West German government is not prepared to ratify the protocol without reservations. After lengthy consultations within NATO the Bonn government now proposes to submit a statement in conjunction with the ratification of the protocol which says that in its view "the provisions on the conduct of war contained in the first codicil were meant to apply to conventional weapons without regard to rules of international law applying to other types of weapons. In particular, these provisions have no bearing on, nor do they regulate or ban the use of nuclear weapons."

This proviso (which is what the statement is all about) appears not to have made any sense to ministry official Schneider. If it is so obvious that the protocol only relates to conventional weapons, then there is no need for such a clarification. But if it is not obvious, then the statement does make sense—in a pretty deadly way. Schneider feels in fact that NATO strategy violates the ban on indiscriminate warfare and in that sense also violates the Geneva protocol. On that score, for that matter, the Bonn government and he are in agreement. Another thing that speaks for it is that France never bothered to sign the document in the first place—by flatly stating that her own deterrent strategy is in no way compatible with it.

The Bonn government resorts to a two-step argument. First, the codicil only applies to conventional weapons and second, the Geneva provisions represent a change and amplification of existing international law.

The fact is that the Geneva negotiations dealt with "humanitarian international law in armed conflicts." Throughout the conference and at its conclusion, the United States and Great Britain did state that the agreements, insofar as they went beyond existing law, applied only to conventional weapons. The Soviet Union, too, made a statement which has been interpreted along similar lines by some experts.

The treaty text, however, does not contain any such language; but it does state that the provisions contained therein are to be applied "to all types of combat." The fact that the problems of nuclear warfare did not go unnoticed in Geneva is reflected in a position paper provided to the German delegation in January 1974 which states that "these provisions are applicable in principle to the use of nuclear weapons as well." There is no record of any such statement at any later date, however. During the course of the negotiations, it would seem, the realization emerged that the Geneva protocol might restrict NATO deterrent strategy and, as a consequence, the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee as well.

In the East Bloc, for that matter, the assumption seems to be that [the] Geneva [protocol] certainly does apply to nuclear war. GDR international law expert Bernhard Graefrath, who was an adviser to the GDR delegation at the Geneva conference and is recognized as an authority in his field in the East Bloc, has written that the statements made by the United States and Great Britain "cannot serve as an interpretation, since they run counter to the distinct language of the protocol." The fact that the Geneva protocol applies to conventional weapons only is arguable at the very least under the circumstances.

The second part of the Bonn government's legal argument points to differences between existing international law and the Geneva protocol. The most important difference being cited is that the protocol severely limits the existing ban (as contained in international law) on indiscriminate attacks by specifying that civilian casualties which are in no way proportionate to immediate or anticipated military gain cannot be countenanced. This argument, too, can be disputed. In any event, there is no refuting the assumption that NATO strategy does not comply with the international law provisions contained in the Geneva protocol—for that matter in two respects (if one considers the use of nuclear weapons as being compatible with international law at all):

1. In the case of first use of nuclear weapons in the densely populated areas of Central Europe the ban on indiscriminate warfare may be violated particularly if such use is meant to serve as a political signal such as a warning based on spectacular use of nuclear weapons which implies that nuclear escalation will follow unless the adversary ceases his attacks. Up to now, the rules were such that "collateral damage" (which is the military technology euphemism for civilian casualties) would be acceptable under such circumstances.

2. Undeniably, the final stage of an escalated nuclear war would go far beyond the scope of the protocol and any kind of international law. "Such warfare would be truly indiscriminate because everyone is equal in death," as SPD Bundestag deputy Verheugen has said.

This puts the insoluble dilemma of deterrence into plain view. At one time, Alois Mertes, the minister of state in the foreign ministry, put it this way: "Even the humanitarian ideals of the Red Cross are confronted with the limits imposed upon them by the political and military preservation of peace." That is wicked language not because the author himself is a wicked man but because it is an expression of the gruesome paradox of deterrence. For all that, the language is honest. And yet, at the same time, the West German government maintains that it will use its own weapons only "in observance of the limitations imposed by the rights of war." It cannot be said that that makes Bonn's position that much clearer.

But what would be the consequences, if the Bonn government went through with its plan of submitting a nuclear declaration in connection with the Geneva protocol? The general view in Bonn would seem to be that such a declaration would merely constitute a self-evident clarification and that it would not alter any of the other provisions of the Geneva protocol. Neither of these arguments sounds convincing, to put it mildly. The language of the German declaration to the effect that the Geneva protocol does "not apply to the use of nuclear weapons...in particular" can only be taken as a demonstrative signal on the part of the FRG that it reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in case of conflict (although it cannot make that decision singlehandedly in any event). What is worse, by insisting on this "redemptive" proviso (a phrase actually being used in this context), it is letting it be known that it would be prepared to accept civilian casualties, even if they turned out to be excessive.

Also Questionable from Foreign Policy Viewpoint

It is understandable that the government feels uncomfortable about the prospect of a public debate on this declaration. That declaration is hard to fathom even for those who tend to agree with the government and of course even less so for staunch partisans of the peace movement. Ministry official Schneider, too, is worried: "The proviso would... make it plain," he says, "that the FRG wishes to rule out the application of the protocol provisions to its own civilian population in case of nuclear war."

Now how would that actually work? What about the existing regulations of the Bundeswehr—which correspond to the provisions of the Geneva protocol similar to the American regulations—would they be altered, too; would they be expanded to include a proviso saying that they do not apply in case of nuclear war?

For another thing it is by no means certain that the Bonn government declaration does not cast doubt on the Geneva protocol as a whole. "Such declarations on the part of NATO nations would cancel virtually all the provisions of the treaty, including those contained in the Geneva agree-

ment whenever these powers decide to commit nuclear weapons," says GDR international law expert Graefrath. "In case declarations or reservations of this sort are submitted upon ratification, it will be in the security interest of each country to make it clear that it is not willing to accept such a (unilateral) modification of the content of the protocol."

In other words, the West German government is going to have a difficult time of it both in terms of foreign and domestic policy—the more so since it appears to be motivated by a strange kind of ambition to be one of the first—if not the first—to present this declaration to a waiting world; the Bonn government acting the part of an international guinea pig. There is every reason to expect the East Bloc propagandists to use the Bonn declaration against NATO in general and the FRG in particular—along the lines of 'here we have evidence once again of who is toying with the idea of nuclear war!'

What is to be done ? One can simply go ahead with the declaration and adopt the point of view that deterrence, as is well known, is a method employed to keep a nuclear war from breaking out in the first place and that it has worked well up to now. In that event the entire issue is reduced to a more or less skillful political presentation or, in fact, to the question of why in all the world Bonn decided on this declaration which can scarcely be made comprehensible from a domestic or foreign policy point of view. Why didn't the government simply put its stamp of approval on the Geneva protocol as it had done earlier with regard to the UN resolution ?

This question is by no means farfetched because the crucial provisions of the protocol are hardly different from existing international law. But that would also mean that NATO strategy, if applied in case of war, would violate international law under any circumstances—Geneva protocol or no Geneva protocol. This view, incidentally, is also being held by some CDU parliamentarians. There comes a point when the declaration grows totally incomprehensible when one recalls that the official Bundeswehr regulations in fact comply with the guidelines of the protocol. Under the circumstances then, the declaration would appear to be a prime and astounding example of political ineptitude.

But this way of looking at things tends to obscure a number of disquieting questions. Is it a sheer coincidence that the Americans were simultaneously cooperating in the drafting of the Geneva protocol and pushing ahead with their miniaturization of nuclear weapons program—of weapons, in other words, which complied with the Geneva provisions and which thereby made it possible to wage war in Central Europe and at the same time made such a war more likely ? But even if one pursues this line of thinking, one is confronted with a dilemma: by adapting nuclear weapons to the provisions of international law nuclear war may become more likely.

Nothing But a Leisure Time Activity ?

Another question: Is the Geneva protocol really just a leisure time activity for humanitarian-oriented scientists toward which the realists who think in terms of hard-nosed security policy can remain indifferent ? For a good while that is pretty much the way it was. But may one—or rather, dare one—waive the opportunity to take advantage of the protection afforded by the Geneva Conventions, including the supplementary protocol however slight the chance may be that they will be observed in case of war ? Prince zu Sayn-Wittgenstein, the president of the German Red Cross, has a very clear opinion on this issue: "If you asked me," he says, "I would not have us issue a qualifying statement with regard to the Geneva protocols because I am concerned about the fact that the protection of our civilian population could be jeopardized thereby."

For another thing, is there really any other, better legal justification in addition to this very protocol for exerting any influence on the weaponry of the allies and particularly the Americans as well as their plans for using these weapons ? And this is the very option the West German government is willing to give up ? How else could any changes in military strategy be substantiated from a legal point of view—changes which have been called for by a great many people; most recently by the international group of the Aspen Institute. "I would venture the prognosis," Helmut Schmidt said years ago, "that the idea of the first use of nuclear weapons to counter a conventional attack will be viewed as more and more inappropriate and in fact unacceptable in the course of the eighties." Is this trend to be prevented ?

In the final analysis then, the dilemma of deterrence becomes very clear: there are two incompatible and at the same time related aspects to it. In the seventies, the focus was on the one aspect: the American nuclear guarantee which maintains peace through deterrence. That is the only explanation for the abovementioned foreign ministry position paper, which Schneider refers to as a "coverup" of the truth vis-a-vis the parliament. The Bundestag was not to be given any information which might create any doubt in the American nuclear guarantee. But in the years since the other aspect has become more clearly visible once again: that the political guarantee is tantamount to guaranteed annihilation, if applied militarily.

Carl-Friedrich von Weizsaecker has reduced this dilemma to the following classic formula: "The atomic bombs fulfill their purpose of safeguarding peace and freedom only if they are never dropped. But they do not fulfill that purpose, if everyone knows that they will never be dropped. And for that very reason there is a danger that they will really be dropped one day." Under these circumstances it is ridiculous on the one hand and ghoulish on the other for astute legal experts to try to define the blinding flash of light, the screams and the horror and the darkness to follow in ways which are compatible with the Bonn interpretation of the Geneva protocol.

Whether you submit it to sober analysis or view it in the light of sweet reason, that nuclear declaration does more harm than good. The best advice one can give to the government is to forget about it.

9478

CSO: 3620/176

FOREIGN MINISTRY ISSUES BOOK STATING POSITION ON 'ZONE'

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Nov 84 p 11

[Article by Lars Christiansson]

[Text] If any of the nuclear powers or any of the Nordic countries rejects the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region, it will be impossible from the Swedish standpoint to implement such a zone.

That is the view of the Swedish Government, and it appears in a book about the Nordic nuclear-free zone that was published by the UD [Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs] on Thursday. The book is part of the UD's official series of publications and is therefore an expression of government policy.

The UD's point of view is formulated as follows:

"One condition, if a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region is to become a reality, is that the countries assumed to be a part of it and the nuclear powers must reach the conclusion that a zone arrangement is in their interest."

Followup

The newly published book on the zone is the result of investigation work that has been underway in the UD practically since the government took office. The project was headed up by Minister of Foreign Affairs Lennart Bodstrom, and quite a number of the UD's experts were part of the working group.

The UD's book does not add any new elements to the government's zone policy as that policy was formulated in Prime Minister Olof Palme's speech to the Paasikivi Society in Helsinki on 1 June 1983. The policy remains firm.

On the other hand, the book does not go any more deeply into the problems associated with the establishment of a nuclear-free zone. The working group was supposed to find solutions to those problems.

Considerations of neutrality policy and the related problems which, from Sweden's standpoint, are associated with the establishment of a nuclear-free zone were thoroughly discussed by the working group, but are dealt with very briefly in the book. The same is true, to use two examples, of the way in which a

zone arrangement would be put together and of how the problem of verifying the absence of nuclear weapons would be solved.

NATO Problem

Nor, except in passing, is there any discussion of the special problems that Danish and Norwegian membership in NATO present as far as establishment of the Nordic zone is concerned.

All the above-mentioned issues were subjects for study by the UD's group, and they have come up time and again in the debate over the Nordic zone.

11798

CSO: 3650/81

BILDT ATTACKS GOVERNMENT'S CAMPAIGN FOR UN NUCLEAR FREEZE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 4 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Carl Bildt, Conservative member of Parliament]

[Text] The proposal for a proclaimed freeze on all nuclear arsenals has gradually been developed into something of a cornerstone of the Social Democratic government's disarmament policy.

Ambassador Theorin has gone so far as to claim that if the Swedish-Mexican draft resolution on the subject in the UNO is not supported, we will freeze to death instead in the nuclear winter that follows an all-out nuclear war. "Freeze now or freeze to death later" is a slogan representative of the zeal and intellectual level that have characterized much of the debate.

The proposal's previous history dates back to the summer of 1982. Mexico's ambassador on disarmament, Garcia Robles, wanted Sweden to endorse a proposal authored by him. In New York, Inga Thorsson felt that it was necessary so as not to lose the initiative in these matters. And back home in Stockholm, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ullsten decided, despite objections by officials in the UD [Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs], to yield to the pressure being exerted by Thorsson over the trans-Atlantic telephone lines.

Recognition from Soviet Union

But at the time, probably no one expected it to amount to anything other than one more in the multitude of UN resolutions.

Under Social Democratic governments, the issue has assumed larger and larger proportions. Despite the ambitious work being done in such areas as efforts to achieve a total halt to the testing of nuclear weapons and a total ban on chemical weapons, it is the freeze issue which dominates the verbal component of the government's disarmament policy.

The freeze issue is also at the center of the so-called five-continent initiative, to which Prime Minister Palme and others attach so much importance.

The demand for an immediate freeze is also one of the most prominent demands in the arsenal of various Soviet so-called disarmament initiatives. The

Swedish line on these issues usually receives appreciative mention in the Soviet media.

The Soviet Union considers it sufficient to say that one is stopping all production of anything having to do with nuclear weapons. The only thing needed is a proclamation, for which negotiations beforehand are not needed at all and in which the question of monitoring compliance is not assigned any real importance.

The propagandistic nature of the Soviet proposal is obvious.

Embarrassing Text

The Swedish-Mexican proposal at the United Nations has received support from various countries in the Third World and from the Eastern bloc's representatives. Practically all the Western countries, on the other hand, have greeted it with great skepticism, not only because of its objective content but also because of the partly propagandistic wording of the text of the resolution.

A disarmament initiative aimed at achieving real results by reviving dialogue between the superpowers in a constructive way is not likely to be worded like the resolution presented by Mexico. On the contrary, it would strive for objective strength and balance in its text.

As far as Sweden's reputation with the two big-power camps on disarmament questions is concerned, the text of the resolution is embarrassing in the long run. And that is why the Norwegian Government's initiative early this fall was well received in Stockholm.

More Acceptable

On the basis of a unanimous decision by Norway's Parliament last spring, Norway's Conservative government wanted to investigate the possibility of working with Sweden to come up with improvements that would make the freeze resolution more acceptable to a number of Western countries. As far as one can judge, the talks between Stockholm and Oslo went well. The Norwegian wishes were received with considerable understanding by Pierre Schori, Swedish under secretary of state for foreign affairs.

The crucial question was whether there should be a declared freeze essentially of the same type as that found in the formal Soviet proposal on the subject or a freeze resulting from negotiations on verification and other issues and one forming an integral part of negotiations aimed at a reduction in nuclear arsenals.

Norway and Sweden agreed on how the draft resolution should be altered on that crucial point.

Caught in the Middle

But that soon proved impossible. Mexico's Garcia Robles accepted some of the minor changes that Norway and Sweden had discussed, but felt that the crucial change agreed on by them was unacceptable. He said that its result would be to make a large number of developing countries skeptical of the resolution.

That left Sweden caught in the middle. It had been tied to Mexico for a number of years on the issue. At the same time, at least some of the leaders in foreign affairs probably realized that the improvements agreed on with Norway were good and sensible and that Norway's support on this issue was worth a good deal more than that of many other countries. As a serious NATO country, Norway carries weight in the inner councils of the West.

Sweden chose to yield to Mexico. And it did so at the same time that several of the more politically oriented officials in the UD were telling the mass media that the Norwegian Government would doubtless have to yield on the issue because Social Democratic colleagues in Oslo were putting on the pressure for all they were worth.

Miscalculated

But on that point they miscalculated. Norway's government acted consistently. The fact that the Swedish-Mexican text was rounded out at the last minute by a few laudatory remarks concerning the Soviet Union probably did not make the Norwegian choice any harder.

As Jo Benkow, the Norwegian Conservative Party's parliamentary leader, pointed out during a debate on the subject in Norway's Parliament on 26 November, the difference between a declared freeze and a negotiated freeze is "all the difference in the world."

In Sweden, the government has tried to present the matter somewhat differently. It has claimed that the difference is minute, but has not been able to explain why, if that is true, Mexico was able to claim that such a minute change would lead to massive loss of support for the resolution.

But since the Swedish Government has upheld different viewpoints in different directions, it must of course claim that there is really no difference between those different viewpoints--quite irrespective of the facts of the case.

Mincing no Words

But one person who has minced no words is Ambassador Theorin. In a parliamentary debate on 21 November, she made it absolutely clear that there is a big difference between the two viewpoints and that it was unthinkable for Sweden to accept Norway's opinion. She said:

"The fact that Sweden listens to the wishes of its Nordic neighbors in its talks with them is only natural... but to conclude from that that we are prepared to change the nature of the freeze resolution completely can only be a

matter of wishful thinking. The difference is considerable.... A negotiated freeze is not a real freeze; instead, it would probably turn into an extremely protracted negotiation."

Obviously, Jo Benkow in Norway's Parliament and Maj-Britt Theorin in Sweden's Parliament--from their very different starting points--are both correct.

Attack on UD Leadership

The fact that Ambassador Theorin's remarks also constituted a direct attack on the UD leadership's way of conducting the talks with Norway and reaching agreement on that crucial point adds a certain piquant touch. This is not surprising, considering Ambassador Theorin's penchant for agitation and playing to the gallery and her consequent aversion to the objectivity of Realpolitik that is required in serious and purposeful diplomacy.

The handling of the freeze issue points up several shortcomings in Swedish disarmament policy.

There is a problem when one's proposals are formulated chiefly with an eye to winning support for them among the Eastern states and in various countries of the Third World. It is always important that support be as broad as possible, but when the aspiration for numerical majorities in the United Nations results in the loss of credibility in crucial countries, the policy is in danger of becoming counterproductive in the long run.

Almost a Veto

Things become even more awkward when one gets into a situation in which another state has what amounts to a veto on Swedish policy. In Stockholm and Oslo, Sweden and Norway agreed on a particular policy, but when the matter reached the United Nations, they went their separate ways because Mexico did not make it possible for Sweden to carry out its policy.

Added to that are the difficulties that obviously exist when it comes to coordinating Swedish policy internally. Ambassador Theorin's statement in Parliament is clear proof that there were those who were never seriously interested in the Swedish-Norwegian government talks. In a conflict between the Swedish line resulting from the talks with Oslo and the opposition from Mexico, she can scarcely have spoken for Sweden in a wholehearted way.

Domestic Politics

And on top of that, there is the tendency to interfere in domestic politics in other Nordic countries which has cropped up from time to time in the government's disarmament policy and which has always been directed against the Conservative governments in Oslo and Copenhagen. There were a great many examples of this in the early debate concerning a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

And in her speech in Parliament on the freeze issue, Ambassador Theorin speculated openly and bluntly that the Norwegian Government would suffer a defeat

on the issue at the hands of its Parliament. It goes without saying that such conduct does not foster trustful cooperation.

Credibility Eroded

Swedish disarmament policy has long had a very good international reputation. This is still the case in crucial respects, examples being the work in Geneva to halt tests and ban chemical weapons or the efforts at the Stockholm Conference. The broad unity that prevails on those crucial elements of Sweden's disarmament policy is well reflected in the disarmament report by Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee.

But on other issues, Sweden's store of credibility has been eroded over the past few years. On the freeze issue, we have gotten locked into a situation which some people would probably like to get us out of but which others want to fight tooth and nail to hang onto.

Almost no expert on the subject believes that a simple proclaimed freeze of the type recommended by both the USSR and the Swedish-Mexican proposal could be anything except a series of votes at the UNO and speeches at demonstrations.

More Ambitious

With a negotiated freeze of the type that even the Swedish Government was aiming for just a few weeks ago, things could, under certain conditions, be different. It is a pity that the government did not want to pursue the Swedish line.

Such a freeze could become an integral part of the U.S.-Soviet talks which, in all likelihood, will begin in 1985. Those talks, of course, will be aimed at achieving a reduction in nuclear arsenals--a goal which in itself is considerably more ambitious than just a freeze on existing weapons arsenals.

The work on behalf of arms control in the nuclear area is of tremendous importance. It is and will remain legitimate for even the small states to make their voices heard on these crucial issues.

Removing Handicaps

But that work will remain difficult and complicated. In all probability, the best path is not that of propagandistic proclamations whose content is vague and compliance with which is scarcely verifiable, but rather that of arduous and precise negotiations in which one small agreement is gradually added to another in a process that will slowly build trust between the two superpowers.

An objective and balanced Swedish disarmament policy should also be able to contribute to such a process. But to do so, it will have to rid itself of the hindrances and handicaps that have been revealed by the moves of recent months in connection with Swedish policy on a freeze.

11798

CSO: 3650/81

CONSERVATIVE PAPER EXAMINES ROLE OF PALME COMMISSION

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 4 Dec 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Palme on Disarmament"]

[Text] One week after the new year begins, Andrey Gromyko and George Shultz will meet in Geneva to discuss arms reductions, and there are many, among them the members of the so-called Palme Commission, who feel called upon to give the foreign ministers of the two superpowers a word of advice on the way.

The Palme Commission concluded a meeting in Chicago on Sunday and issued a document containing a number of points intended for inclusion on the agenda for the Geneva talks.

According to the correspondent for the TT [PRESS WIRE SERVICE, INC.], Prime Minister Olof Palme said: "We trust that the representatives of the big powers are able to read. If they really want to reach agreement, they cannot ignore the points we are indicating."

Perhaps that is true, for several of the commission's points--improving relations between East and West, reaching agreement on a substantial reduction in nuclear arsenals, ratifying the agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and so on--are general stuff in the formation of opinion concerning security policy.

Other points are more controversial. This is especially true of the question of space weapons. The Palme Commission makes a strong attack on the Star Wars strategy that President Ronald Reagan has made his pet concern. That strategy is intended to give the United States an airtight defense against nuclear missiles.

The Palme Commission is by no means alone in its criticism, which is shared by a long list of respected security observers. The doubts are of two kinds. First, it is doubted that the Star Wars strategy, which would cost tremendous amounts of money, could even be carried out, and second, it is feared that U.S. concentration on that strategy would have the effect of tearing up the 1972 agreement banning antimissile missiles--considered the foremost achievement of disarmament efforts to date.

Naturally, it is the last-named aspect that concerns the Palme Commission. It is proposing instead that the 1972 agreement be strengthened.

The Palme Commission introduced the concept of "joint security" in its first report a couple of years ago, and it is now saying that developments have shown that the idea is more important than ever.

The only problem is that the commission has never been able to explain what the concept means except that it should be seen as an alternative to the policy of deterrence, which is described as obsolete and dangerous.

That being the case, there is even greater reason to listen to the Aspen Institute, which recently issued a report on relations between East and West. The report contains several viewpoints similar to those of the Palme Commission, but it stresses the value of the policy of deterrence, which it says is neither immoral nor illogical. One side's weapons guarantee that the other's will not be used. We have now had almost four decades of nuclear peace despite serious crises between East and West.

The Palme Commission's blurred philosophizing about "joint security" certainly does not strengthen its authority. The commission also suffers from other credibility problems. There is reason to ask whose interests it represents. The United States is represented on the commission by former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who, when it comes to views and assessments, stands a great distance from the Reagan administration, while Georgiy Arbatov, naturally, is an obedient tool of the Soviet leadership.

Added to that are Palme's strange and often controversial double role as chairman of the commission and Swedish prime minister and Palme's international image.

"Olof Palme's own person limits the commission's influence. He stands out as a liberal to the point of foolishness." So says the well-known American journalist Bruce Talbott (and what Talbott means here by "liberal" is "left radical"). It should be noted that Talbott is by no means a hawk. He recently published a book strongly critical of the Reagan administration's neglect of disarmament policy.

Talbott is also undoubtedly correct in saying that the Palme Commission's influence is limited. The task that the commission set for itself--to arouse and win a hearing for proposals that might reduce the danger of nuclear war--is certainly urgent, but it ought to be possible to carry it out in a more convincing manner than the commission has been able to do so far.

11798
CSO: 3650/81

MINISTER SEES 'TENSE' YEAR AHEAD FOR GREENLAND

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 31 Dec 84 p 7

[Article by sol.]

[Text] The year 1985 is probably the year which since the end of World War II has been awaited with the greatest amount of tension in Greenland, says Minister of Greenland Affairs Tom Høyem. Greenland will withdraw from the EC. Greenland will itself take over the entire production and export sector of the Greenland Trade Department and all of the subsidies for the trades and industries in Greenland, and in the course of 1985 the exploration for oil in East Greenland will get started.

On the take-over by Greenland of the activities of the Greenland Trade Department, the minister of Greenland affairs says that at midnight on New Year's Eve, 2,100 employees will be transferred from him as their chief boss to the chairman of the local Greenland government.

"The coming year will see an acceleration of the transfer of tasks to Greenland. It will be the supreme task of the minister of Greenland affairs to make himself superfluous. However, it is our historical task to do it in a harmonious and planned way so as to avoid any unnecessary problems from arising afterwards," the minister of Greenland affairs says.

7262

CSO: 3613/63

GREENLAND GROWING INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED WITH EC

Copenhagen BERLINSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Dec 84 p 8

[Editorial: "Obstacles Delaying Withdrawal From EC"]

[Text] It is a great obstacle for decisions made in Greenland and within the EC that the Irish parliament has not been able to ratify in time the agreement which formally marks Greenland's withdrawal from the EC. It is open to discussion whether Greenland's position toward the EC was sensible when it was decided to discontinue Greenland's membership. However, that is a discussion of history, with no significance, neither to Greenland nor to the EC. The decisive thing now is that the negotiations on the matter have now come to an end, and that Greenland has been given extremely favorable conditions of withdrawal. The decisive thing also is that an obstacle has occurred, which could not be foreseen, as a result of which the date of withdrawal cannot be complied with.

The situation may develop into bitterness on the part of Greenland against the EC, against Ireland, which did not act in time, against France, which has succumbed to formalities, or against Denmark because the Danish government, after all, represents the joint kingdom. The bitterness, if any, should not, however, cause the local government of Greenland to get panicky. There is little likelihood that the withdrawal may take effect as of 1 February. Even if a month's postponement may be difficult to take--not least psychologically--the sense of reality will have to prevail over emotions.

The worst imaginable situation, both in the view of Greenland and the EC, will be if so many difficulties arise that all of the negotiations concerning Greenland's withdrawal will have to commence anew. The EC has got a new commission, and there may be member countries which will want to change their views on the conditions for the withdrawal. There will be no guarantee that new negotiations will lead to the same result.

That is why there is not much else for the local Greenland government to do but to put up with the delay, regardless of the difficulties caused, both at the administrative and psychological levels.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS CONTINUE TO FUEL COMMENTARY

Significant Papandreou-Karamanlis Meetings

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 2 Dec 84 p 1

/Unsigned editorial: "Meetings and Their Value"/

/Text/ Discussions between the president and prime minister are leading to a clarification of the political context within which the three major issues of 1985 will be decided --the vote on the new electoral law after January, the election of a new president in April and parliamentary elections next fall.

How, then, do talks between the two men help? They help in dispelling certain myths and certain malicious expectations that could only harm the peaceful development of our political issues.

The myth about the government's "fascist" aims has been attentively cultivated by the present major government opposition party. Not only with its amusing accusations about "fascist" television to which public opinion does not lend much credence since it knows that Greek television is moderate, most moderate as to be non-existent, but not fascist.

What are more dangerous because they do not refer to real events but only intentions are the rumors circulating in the Right to the effect that it is not at all certain that elections will take place, that they might be "the last elections we will ever see" and other such rumors about...the twilight of democratic processes!

At least the Karamanlis-Papandreou discussions have this attribute: they will dispel every such act of sabotage because no one can talk about "misgivings"-- it would an exaggerated honor for one to describe these fabricated lies as "misgivings."

But there is also another more practical side to our political life that is buttressed by the identity of views of both officials --one for the state and the other for the governing of the country. This relates to the guarantee of irreproachable processes for the coming choices and elections --selection of an electoral law and two elections-- which, as we have pointed out, constitute the 1985 landmarks.

Not that the government intends to resort to "sleight of hand" or "fascist initiatives!" But the regular view of the president of the republic about an arrangement of the processes puts an end to the false question of the Right.

It is not possible to prejudge what the final political desire of the parties and what the practical end to the electoral law issue will be. The government will propose its own kind of proportional system. We do not yet know if the government opposition will accept or reject it or if the government perseveres or withdraws it so as to remain with the prevailing system.

What we can consider as certain is that no wavering as to processes is justified. As for the substance, the Chamber of Deputies will make a judgement.

Importance of Karamanlis Election

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 2 Dec 84 p 3

/Article by Kh. K. Bousbourelis; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface/

/Excerpts/ Neither the president of the republic nor the prime minister seem to be worried over what has been happening or has been allegedly happening in our country recently. The only one worrying is the leader of the major government opposition party who more or less worries because he realizes that the president of the republic /is not worrying./

"Everything Will Develop Normally"

The president of the republic believes that everything will develop normally and there is not evidence whatsoever that the prime minister does not share the president's optimism.

What are those things that will develop normally and how is it possible that they might not develop normally. /The key/ appears to be the electoral law, the system with which the parliamentary elections will take place in October 1985 at the latest.

Of course, the government does have the majority to have any electoral law it wants passed in the Chamber of Deputies.

If, however, this law were to provoke a revolt in the government opposition, either overall (i.e. among both conservatives and communists) or in the major government opposition party, then it is problematic if it will be signed by the president of the republic, at which time a crisis will develop and even the possibility of an early presidential election in which, of course, Mr Karamanlis will not be a candidate.

In this eventuality, the Chamber of Deputies will be dissolved and elections will take place under the existing reinforced electoral system without the preference cross and overall power, both the presidency and the government, will be gambled off at the throw of dice. Indeed, after a pre-electoral period whose ferociousness will be astonishing. And all of these things are possible during the winter.

How possible is this?

Almost unavoidable, one may say, because --if he has any basic good faith-- it must be accepted that all that has been said up to now by the minister of interior --regardless of the vehemence of the style and descriptions that he often uses-- an electoral law is foreseen that will in essence be acceptable to all segments of the Chamber of Deputies.

It is another matter if the legitimate reasons the government opposition parties are all thunder and lightning with charges during a pre-electoral period.

The first phase, after the key electoral law, is the presidential election. Since last summer this column has been stressing one point, namely that the question is not /if/ Mr Karamanlis will accept a second presidential term /but how/ without the writer of this column daring to express the president's views he believes that (especially after the president's public statements in Salonica on 26 October and just the past week to reporters accompanying him to Bucharest) he can surmise that Mr Karamanlis himself will provide many more indications on /how/ he views the role of president in specific circumstances under which the beginning of the second presidential term will take place. The presidential reception for journalists will take place in 15 days and, of course, the New Year's message also.

The writer would also venture an interpretation at the risk of being misinterpreted. If, during his first term, Mr Karamanlis succeeded not only in the normal transmission of power from one party, that had reached a point where it had considered it its own possession, to another party that had been excluded from office for half a century (with very few insignificant intervals), he also had succeeded in establishing harmonious cooperation with Mr A. Papandreou and the government of Change. In his second term of office --if he should accept it-- he will exercise his duties and he will use his jurisdictions authorized him by the constitution to succeed in obtaining agreement in the "two parties."

If, therefore, he were to accept a second term, this will mean that he himself believes that /this agreement is attainable/ and that his celebrated election with 270 votes for and perhaps /none against/ him will allow him to pursue this goal with every prospect that he will succeed.

With 270 votes, Mr Karamanlis will have been proclaimed Princeps Augustus and it would be natural for him to seek a Pax Augustus in our political affairs.

Prolonged Silence Seen Harmful

Athens ANDI in Greek 7 Dec 84 p 6

Excerpts Unfortunately, both as to the validity of institutions as well as to the validity of individuals themselves, Mr Karamanlis and Mr Papandreou are keeping up --through their own responsibility-- all this talk about a presidential election.

What results from all that has become known on their relations is that in reality "the problem" has been resolved, i.e. that Mr Karamanlis will be the candidate and that Mr Papandreou will vote for him.

Taking this into account, everything that is happening around this issue is surprising. This is so because both elementary logic and the "deep feeling of political responsibility" that both men often ask for compels Mr Karamanlis to announce his candidacy and Mr Papandreou his vote.

Although now Mr Karamanlis is playing the part of a sphinx, a kind of Balkan de Gaulle who is trying to understand if the noises emanating from the National Garden are messages of history directed at him, while Mr Papandreou is trying with his noise-making to hide his real choices.

We assume, of course, that things are a little more complicated than that and that a tough bargaining "hegemony" game is hidden "at the bottom." Because Mr Karamanlis would have liked to make it appear that PASOK had become pro-Karamanlis and for that reason it had asked that he be elected, while Mr Papandreou would have liked to make it appear that Mr Karamanlis is pro-PASOK --and for that reason voted for him.

This aspect of the relations of the two men concerns, in reality, very little the historical aspect of the issue. Because the "historical coexistence" of two major political currents, i.e. of the modernized Right and the democratic ratification of modernized "priorities" has already taken place, in fact so that there is no need to symbolically replace it.

When one thinks of the agitated political atmosphere, with its bombs, the heightened sharp rhetoric of Mr Mitsotakis and the national issues continuously held in abeyance, we do not have the luxury of such games. All this chatter about the presidential election must come to a stop some time. Because sometimes the prolongation of games with respect to decisions that have already been made endangers their successful implementation...

Destabilization Attempt Seen

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 7-13 Dec 84 pp 12-13

/Excerpts/ At some point the prime minister and his government must realize that they do not have the right to stake everything for the sake of doubtful party expedencies because neither the country nor the people have authorized them to upset everything in the country.

This, finally, is the belief of political observers of all political parties following the new crisis over "talk about the presidency" that --and this is the more disturbing-- the government once again has brought back and promoted. It is with concern and greater suspicion that the political world of the country is seeing the government and its leader becoming involved in the political struggle that time-wise coincides with the beginning of the pre-electoral campaign, even with the highest office in Greece, namely the presidency of the republic.

Astonished and frightened over the possible disagreeable and uncontrolled developments, political observers remember that in the not too distant past the institution of the highest office of the land had once again become the target of inter-party frictions. And the frightful results of that event is even now extremely bitter for the country since they led to a long period of darkness and national humiliation.

Symptoms

The outside symptoms of this dangerous "talk about the presidency" are more or less known to all: printed materials (from so-called reliable Athens daily newspapers as well as weekly satirical magazines and popular magazines of Athens) are at times systematically trying to portray the president of the republic as being involved in domestic political disputes, indeed even by taking positions on them, while at other times they go back to previous decades to ascribe responsibilities or omissions. Sometimes these documents criticize the president for specific actions just to maintain the overall issue in the public eye. The last phase of this "talk about the presidency" is to create the impression that Konstandinos Karamanlis is negotiating with the government about those terms under which both sides would accept that he be re-elected president for another 5-year term of office (1985-1990.) Indeed, these terms are restrictive on the president insofar as his right to verbally communicate with the people.

The process that is used to channel all of this to Greek public opinion is the same used in the past: the well-known pro-government publications, thus strengthening the panhellenic conviction that the government is once again behind all this campaign against this state institution.

Having the still fresh wounds from these various phases of the regime problem that over so many decades has tormented Greece, the people have absolutely no reason for any new vicissitudes. They do not accept nor are they willing to permit political parties to draw this delicate issue into inter-party frictions. Perhaps the responsibility of PASOK and its leadership are vast at this point because it has become evident that both party and leadership are trying to implicate the presidency in inter-party activities with the goal being to get as much party benefits as possible. They are particularly exploiting the security offered a great segment of PASOK voters by the certainty that Karamanlis will be president for the next 5 years. This is exactly what PASOK and Kastris are trying to exploit without, however, displeasing their leftist wing that has reason not to want a new Karamanlis term of office. The latest explosion of this talk about the presidency has as its goal to strike at the president's reputation, having him appear as discussing the conditions under which he would once again become a candidate, indeed being forced to accept the government's conditions.

These aims were at once noticed by public opinion that has finally come to know how PASOK and its leadership reacts and how the latter do not intend to stop in the face of anyone whenever they feel that they will benefit politically.

In connection with previously published reports against the president of the republic, public opinion does, indeed, find it natural to be concerned and to ask: has not the recent past brought Mr Papandreou and his government to their senses? Can the country endure another new crisis of regime? When Greece has to face so many serious foreign problems that reach the point of threats against its sovereignty, is this the time to add other problems? Why does not Mr Papandreou decide at some point to set aside certain problems from the usual inter-party ones, problems that relate to the state itself, foreign policy and the defense of the country? He has such a wide variety from which to choose.

Possible Government Involvement

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 7-13 Dec 84 p 10

/Unsigned editorial: "What Does He Want?"

/Text/ It has been noted that a member of the government has been fueling the "anti-Karamanlis" campaign of a segment of the press with particular persistence.

This fact cannot have escaped the attention of the prime minister, but, of course, it would be exaggerated to maintain that it happens to have his approval.

Perhaps this is only one --of many-- sign that shows that within PASOK and the government many winds are blowing and that many leaderships have been formed, aside from the Germans and Americans that I KATHIMERINI has recorded.

If, however, the prime minister happens to have other views, why does he not come forward and recommend self-restraint to his associates? But if he does happen to agree with them, why does he maintain the opposite? What does the prime minister, in the final analysis, really want and what is he seeking?

5671

CSO: 3521/112

PROS, CONS OF SIMPLE, REINFORCED PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 2-3 Dec 84 pp 4, 15

/Article by G. V. Xanthakis/

/Text/ The introduction of the electoral bill for enactment in the Chamber of Deputies /Vouli/--no matter how soon it takes place--will not end the discussion over the most suitable electoral system from a democratic point of view. Both systems--simple or reinforced--have their supporters and arguments in their favor. So the bill will only open up the debate...Indeed, the scientific dialogue and political distinctions, which have appeared internationally, make it possible to try a deeper and more comprehensive analysis. Our participation in the discussion, which started in the pages of KATHIMERINI, makes sense only if it aspires to contribute to analytical thinking, not to the presentation of fixed views which claim universal acceptance.

The Constitution Favors Strong Governments
But Does Not Say So Specifically

If we were to assume--rather naively--that the electoral system is simply a technical method for the election of deputies, we risk giving to the constitution a superficial and simplified dimension which is not in line with its role as the foundation of legal order and the political structure. An electoral system is never innocent. The preference of one or the other system at the expense of others is justly regarded as having ulterior motives.

In reality, the electoral system is above all a procedural means for the expression of the public will. Now that the division between the Vouli and the executive branch is historically over, the popular sovereignty in present-day democracy, which increasingly seeks a more direct expression, is shown through the formation and unhindered functioning of the governmental majority.

While this is the philosophy of our constitution, the will of the constitutional legislator is not specifically expressed.

Therefore, Dimitrios Tsatsos was right when, as spokesman for the opposition at the Constitutional Assembly, he protested that the electoral system was not institutionalized to form a permanent guarantee of government stability. He had the sound view that the constitution should include at least a nucleus of provisions setting a framework within which the common legislator would be able to move, but at the same time limit his movements.

This imperfection makes it possible for the party in power to manufacture electoral laws on the eve of an election which fits the electoral process to its own needs.

But the direct application of the principle of popular sovereignty in conjunction with the democratic principle make such laws unconstitutional. Even though the letter of the constitution (Art. 54) seems to regard all electoral systems as legitimate, the aforesaid principles in the specific institutional context and contemporary sociopolitical conditions are binding.

Simple Proportional?
Strengthening or Weakening Democracy?

Those who favor the simple proportional argue that it is the most fair system because the representation of each party in the Vouli corresponds to their electoral strength. But even this is subject to question because very soon thereafter this proportion becomes fictional because public opinion constantly changes; therefore, the problem is not put on the proper basis.

"The various electoral systems are not passive instruments which simply and clearly reflect public opinion. They are mainly designed to give it a form. The election is a procedure for legitimizing power, rejecting a policy, or instituting a government for the country until the next election."

(J. L. Debre, "The Dispute Over the Simple Proportional," L'ACTUALITE, No. 32, June 1977)

The simple proportional, with the opportunities it provides for the small parties, makes it possible--if not impossible--to form a self-sufficient government majority. Opposition to this is not because of the fact that "in this way the result is a government of cooperating parties which quarrel and undermine each other, and which oppose the actions of their partners so that in the end it is impossible to produce effective results," as the newspaper MAKEDONIA portrayed K. Karamanlis as stating ("Pros and Cons of Simple Proportional," 9 February 1982).

Opposition to this--and its contradiction to the democratic principle--is centered on the fact that the coalition government majorities do not correspond to a popular majority, not even particular minorities. Because the votes given to each party were given so the party could implement its own program; and because the cabinets rise and fall not because the people want it but because of agreements among politicians without popular approval which, even when they invoke it, relates to the rejection of one or another

...cy, not to the acceptance of the coalition government. It seems that with such a possibility in mind PASOK is now promoting the famous anti-Right groupings.

This is what Kostas Tsaloglou apparently overlooked (KATHIMERINI 23-24 September 1984) when he did not take into account that coalition governments are not made by the people but by certain party leaders. While he further argues that with the reinforced proportional system the responsibility for viable governments is not borne by the people, he leaves out that although the formation of the government is the result of the electoral process, at least this process is known to the people in advance.

This refutes the argument of another writer in KATHIMERINI (16 January 1983) that the frequent cabinet crises in Italy, because of the simple proportional, did not harm the parliamentary democracy. Yet, is it not clear that parliamentarism and democracy are seriously harmed when the Christian Democrats have to join the communists in order to stay in office and on the essential political choices?

Conflict: Product of Simple Proportional

The question of polarization because of the reinforced proportional raised by the advocates of simple proportional is fraudulent. Countries which have majoritarian systems and by necessity a two-party system like the Anglo Saxon countries, do not face similar problems.

By contrast, the simple proportional which gives an opportunity to all parties to express themselves, forces the bigger parties to engage in a constant fight to secure votes and first place, something that could have been achieved without much trouble through a system of reinforced proportional. What better proof than the recent Euroelection?

At the same time the simple proportional dangerously strengthens the extreme tendencies with unforeseen consequences for our democratic system. "The multiplication of parties is accompanied by extremism, considering the experiences of the Weimar Republic and the Fourth French Republic," according to A. Hauriou (Constitutional Law, p 311, 1980).

Coming back to Greece, we should not forget the proposal by PASOK cadres (MAKEDONIA 9 February 1982; ELEVTHEROTYPIA 18 July 1984) to combine the use of simple proportional with a general amnesty for the imprisoned junta leaders so they could form a party and take away votes from the New Democracy Party.

The Reinforced Proportional in the Service of Intraparty Democracy and of the Constitution

The system of reinforced proportional not only tones down the overall political climate, but "by transferring the intense ideological conflict from

the national political scene to the organs of the major parties, it leads to parties of wide ideological content which often develop a profile of general acceptance with intraparty democratic processes," according to A. Andrianopoulos (MESIMVRINI 11 October 1982).

By contrast, the simple proportional creates strong parties based on autocratic, personality cult party machines, but without democratic processes. As a result, a weak institutional structure corresponds to the strong parties, especially since the simple proportional is adjusted to all political fashions and weakens syndicalism and parliamentarism in favor of the civil service establishment.

From this point of view, even the reservations on a bipartisan basis appear baseless since, in effect, in every party there exists different trends which work together, while multi-partisan opposing parties fight one another with fanaticism.

The Simple Proportional Was Used,
Is Worn Out, and Needs Strengthening

Like all other innovations the fashion of simple proportional came to Greece from abroad, after it was already obsolete there.

Since 1948 one country after another, after trying the simple proportional, turned to electoral systems which lead to viable governments. The mere listing (Frangopoulos in KATHIMERINI 14 October 1984) of the countries which experimented with simple proportional, without even an elementary reference to the consequences, is not even an argument.

In Belgium in addition to "rightist" and communist parties which grew at a certain point only temporarily, the country experienced five very serious crises since the war because of the disputes between the two communities which the weak cabinets could not handle.

In the three Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) "the adoption of the simple proportional reduced the appeal of the Center and strengthened the extremist parties" (M. Duverger, "Political Institutions," p 150, 1980). The German Weimar Republic died precisely because of the extremism born and fed by the simple proportional, not to mention the international adventure of World War II.

And to return to our country we should not leave without comment the approval of the present Greek electoral system by the prominent--and not at all conservative--constitutional expert of France A. Hauriou.

How to Socialistically Transform the Scientific Terms

PASOK provokes the irony of the scientific and political community when it speaks of a "system" of simple proportional, in an effort to bridge its pre-elections, largely forgotten promises for simple, unadulterated proportional in its desire to secure a stable majority.

The simple proportional is a clear-cut system. But a "system of simple proportional" is in effect a "reinforced" proportional with a different name to look more socialistic.

We Shall Go to the Election Only if the Rules of the Game are Clear

The patronizing attitude of all constitutional factors interrupted only temporarily the dirge of the government sirens of electoral talk. The premier's statement concerning the election does not quiet the intense worries of everyone with regard to the time or manner of the election.

As long as the issue of the electoral system remains unsettled, PASOK will be deservedly accused not only of planning a surprise but also of inconsistency with its position on the timely introduction of the electoral system, a position advocated during the debate over the constitutional text which unfortunately was not adopted.

The decidedly serious argument that the "early settlement of the electoral system would create an electoral atmosphere and artificially intensify the political contest, which would lead to early elections" (VIMA 6 February 1983) was refuted by the fact that the recent electoral talk came from PASOK and only from PASOK.

In any event, whatever the electoral system, it is more important that the elections take place in conditions of real equality without the unacceptable excesses of television and interference of ministers and nomarchs, and particularly without taking the parties by surprise.

Papandreou now has the opportunity to make a contribution to more open rules of electoral contest, which is a component of the political spectrum and also a right of the opposition, especially in a democratic, pluralistic regime.

Biographical Note

Georgios Vyronos Xanthakis, 26, is an attorney, a graduate of administrative and constitutional law of the University of Paris (DEA Paris 2). He received a scholarship from the State Scholarship Institute and is a Ph.D candidate in political institutions. He has repeatedly received awards for his

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CSO: 3521/106

LEFT SEEN AMBIVALENT ON KARAMANLIS' ELECTION

Athens ENA in Greek 20 Dec 84 p 10

[Text] Both the KKE and the KKE of The Interior view today's president of the republic as an element of democratic stability and they believe that his reelection would be a guarantee of normal political developments. In spite of the foregoing the parties of the communist Left are not inclined to contribute to Karamanlis' reelection with actions but only through abstention (by staying away from the relevant voting and by avoiding any attempt to promote some rival candidate.) In a few words the Left wants K. Karamanlis but will let everyone except its followers vote for him.

The issue of the presidential election has occupied the meetings of the higher organs of both communist parties during the past month. The KKE's evaluations regarding the presidential election are summarized in the following formulation of the Central Committee's decisions: "Some circles, through slanted articles in the press, are intensifying a disorienting discussion of the presidential election with the aim of pressuring the government into making further concessions to the establishment and of shunting its political achievements onto a conservative track."

Mr. Florakis undertook to explain in greater detail this excerpt in the interview he recently granted NEA. When the question was put to him to what extent the president of the republic also belonged to the establishment Mr. Florakis avoided answering in the affirmative. He contented himself simply with saying that: "The president of the republic has well known views on foreign and domestic issues." But he expressed his private concern about the extent of the cooperation between parties for K. Karamanlis' election which could constitute the beginning of a much wider cooperation between the two main parties.

During that same interview Mr. Florakis answered the following blunt question: "Is the historic K. Karamanlis - A. Papandreou compromise a prerequisite for democratic normalcy?" By his answer the secretary general of the KKE proved that he is a flexible and moderate politician: "K. Karamanlis," he said, "is a stabilizing factor in today's state of affairs. But not for the real Change as well."

The term "today's state of affairs" is open to two interpretations: the first, which is aimed at the KKE followers, means "the continuation of the bourgeois regime" and to a second one which is aimed at a wider public opinion and means: "ensuring the present system of freedoms against a possible reversal toward

(and originating from) the Right."

The KKE party organ promoted, as was expected, the first version. The rest of the political world noted with interest the KKE's capacity, under Mr. Florakis, to "cover all bases."

The secretary general of the KKE does not appear inclined to make life difficult for A. Papandreou just because the PASOK will vote for K. Karamanlis. And that is why the KKE has no intention of designating another candidate for the office of president who could undoubtedly attract the preferences of some displeased deputies.

But if the presidential election is nothing but a first step toward cooperation of the PASOK with forces to its right, then the KKE is determined to declare war.

In the KKE of The Interior matters are more complex. The common denominator of its leading members' evaluations is that a possible conflict regarding the presidential election might lead the nation to vicissitudes. What appears to set the KKE of The Interior apart is how far the leftist opposition within the PASOK is reconciled with its being covered by those same leftists in the presidential election.

It appears that once more the Left as a whole will adopt a position regarding the presidential election which will be hard for its basic electorate to accept. Which "wants" Karamanlis because it fears a recurrence of a heated direct confrontation.

Besides, a phenomenon which totally differentiates the period of the political change from that preceding the dictatorship is the acceptance of K. Karamanlis by the basic electorate of the Left which was registered in the election results of 1974. This phenomenon has reached extraordinary dimensions during the period of the PASOK government. The more the distance between the followers of the Left and the government has increased, the more they have sought in Karamanlis' reelection a [safety] valve for normal developments.

The leaders of the two communist parties are aware of the basic electorate's inclinations as they appear determined not to give their differences the dimensions of a rift during the presidential election.

12278

CSO: 3521/126

'SECRET' DOCUMENT ON PASOK RELIANCE ON ANTI-AMERICANISM

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 19 Dec 84 p 4

[Text] "How We Will Bolster The Change"

.By genuinely supporting the government's work and constantly informing the people. By giving priority to the renewal of our vision and speeding the rythm of the change.

. Popular participation in the mass movement must become concrete and energetic at the level of the village, the city and the province.

.Our declarations must be implemented and the citizens' daily problems must be dealt with, not through a "system of favoritism" but with regard to institutions and new achievements. "

To achieve these aims it is essential to:

.Develope our party forces and liven up party activities.

.Reinforce the meaning of PASOK at every level (local, regional, central).

.Gather within the bloc of the Change wider political and social forces.

The PASOK Central Enlightenment Committee sent a panicky circular to the Movement's party organizations two weeks ago.

The circular which was issued to the EG [Staff Office] and the KE [Central Committee] and to the parliamentary group warned the followers of the PASOK of an escalation in our relations with United States of America.

By betraying this acute uneasiness about the course Greek-American relations are taking the PASOK's advisers give an indirect but very clear warning to keep calm in the face of a very likely deterioration of relations with the U.S.A. and NATO.

More specifically, the PASOK's Enlightenment Committee in its "political report" states that:

.Reagan's election in the U.S. is the expression of the forces which want to impose a worldwide domination at all costs. Our relations with the U.S. are

likely to get worse and we must react with caution and above all steel the people's unity.

Our insistence on the dates set for the withdrawal of the bases and our international initiatives (for instance a joint declaration from 6 leaders) are the crucial points in our relations.

As far as the nation's relations with NATO are concerned, it is noted in the report that: "they are characterized by the Greek government's three fixed positions on the issues of Limnos, controlling the enterprise sector and decreasing responsibility limits in the area of the Aegean."

The cancelling of the joint NATO exercises, it is underlined, and the stopping of the U.S. aircraft which trespassed on our air space constitute recent examples of the problems in our relations.

The conflict between the forces of national independence and the forces of domination" the report concludes at this point, "has taken a course which is on the verge of a breach. Without our going that far."

Special importance is given in the report to the faulty working of party mechanisms, to the disenchantment of basic elements and to the criticisms the PASOK's own followers direct against the government's work.

12278
CSO: 3521/126

TIKHONOV VISIT TO TURKEY BLOW TO PASOK

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 28 Dec 84 p 1

[Text] The New Democracy characterizes as a bitter blow to the PASOK's foreign policy Soviet Premier Nicolai Tikhonov's visit to Ankara and the economic and political support the USSR is offering to Turkey's Evren regime , which promoted highly significant economic agreements worth 6 billion dollars annually with the Soviet Union without giving anything in exchange or making any kind of concession.

The fact that Mr. Tikhonov's official visit was not even sealed with the publication of a joint communique, presumably because Turkey refused to make any kind of derogatory allusion to the West, was noted as a sign of the inequality of the Kremlin's relations with Ankara and Athens. And so with eloquent sternness the New Democracy notes that the PASOK's well known pro-Soviet stance achieved nothing in the field of bilateral relations with the USSR while, at the same time, they brought about a weakening of our foreign policy's traditional mainstays.

The following are also worth noting, on the occasion of Mr. Tikhonov's visit to Ankara:

1. Mr. Tikhonov is the first premier of a great power to visit Ankara and to have official talks with Turkey's military regime which has been repeatedly condemned by the West.
2. No European leader or no leader of the West, in general, has paid an official visit to Evren.
3. According to NATO information, the Soviet Union is the nation which has offered up to now the greatest financial assistance to Turkey, even greater than that of the United States.
4. During yesterday's information session, the government spokesman, despite the insistence of political correspondants, refused to comment on the Soviet premier's visit to Ankara, both with regard to the Greek government's pro-Soviet stance and to the fact that the Soviet premier paid a visit to a regime which has trampled human rights.

The fact that Ankara did not resort to any anti-American outbursts or display a hostile attitude toward the West in order to achieve an economic agreement

with the USSR is also characteristic of Turkish skill in matters of foreign policy. Quite on the contrary, the differences of opinion on questions of international policy constituted an excuse for not issuing a joint communique. As mentioned by Ankara, Turkey and the Soviet Union renounced issuing a joint communique after Soviet Premier Nicolai Tikhonov's two day visit to Ankara because of the restrictions laid down by the officials who worked on the draft of the joint communique.

Earlier the semi official news agency ANATOLIA had released the news that a joint Turkish-Soviet communique would be published after Mr. Tikhonov's departure from Ankara.

Diplomatic sources pointed out that officials agreed on not making any declaration because the joint communique had been considerably toned down due to differences of opinion.

12278

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PASOK PLANS 'ANTI-RIGHT GROUPINGS'

Division in Top Leadership

Athens ENA in Greek 22 Nov 84 p 13

/Excerpts/ The Committees of Anti-Right Citizens /EAP/ will be discussed at the meeting of the PASOK Central Committee which--except for unforeseen obstacles--will meet in Athens on 8 and 9 December.

The EAP has caused a division in the leading echelons of PASOK over the question of whether they should be formed and what their structure should be.

Most members of the Executive Bureau who have proposed these committees believe they should be formed in every nome and function side by side with the PASOK organization.

These committees, which are patterned after the "Patriotic Front" of the Bulgarian Communist Party, but which are related to the corresponding committees formed in the municipal elections for the support of candidates, will be joined by "all democratic citizens who oppose the Right."

PASOK cadres who disagree with this argue that the formation of such committees presents three problems:

1. It weakens and pushes aside the organized base of PASOK.
2. It helps the ND unite the people around it as a reaction to the anti-Right citizens.
3. There is a danger in having an organized participation of party cadres from other political forces (such as KKE) with the objective of using the committees for other purposes.

Those who disagree propose to have the cooperation of anti-Right, but proven pro-PASOK personalities, with PASOK's local organizations since those organizations are in a good position to know persons and conditions.

Overtures to Center

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 20 Nov 84 p 9

/Article by Viktor Netas/

/Excerpts/ PASOK is attempting a real opening to those not associated with the Center and Left, asking them to support the policy of "Change" but without demanding that they join the party. As it has been announced, the opening will take place through the formation of "Anti-Right Groupings of Democratic Citizens."

Personally, I do not agree with this title because these unassociated democratic citizens have clear views which do not result from certain sterile opposition but from more general thoughts and special political sensitivity and worries for the country's present and future. These views cannot be ignored by the governing party--which wants to go on governing seeking support--and depend only on the anti-right alignment.

In this opening there is another more general question involved. Does PASOK seek from unassociated democrats of the Center and Left only electoral support or a more general participation in the overall effort of Change?

In any event, it will be a mistake to limit itself only to electoral support. These forces, distinguished by their lofty principles, democratic devotion and great prospects for valuable contributions, must be used profitably. They must be drafted into the great democratic struggle for the country's well being. Such a genuine opening would overcome and push aside the objections resulting from narrow partisan views which differentiate between members and non-members.

Such distinctions must be removed from a common democratic effort in which what counts is the overall contribution and consistency and not the enlistment in a certain branch or other party organization. This petty partisan practice has been rather harmful. Therefore, it is time for an opening.

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CSO: 3521/104

PERSONALITIES MENTIONED AS POSSIBLE KARAMANLIS' SUCCESSORS

Athens ENA in Greek 22 Nov 84 p 10

/Text/ In the event K. Karamanlis says "no" to the proposal that he stand for re-election to the presidency of the Republic, PASOK must be ready with alternative solutions. These solutions, according to ENA information, were discussed in recent meetings of the /PASOK/ Executive Bureau.

According to the same reports, those discussed--in terms of priority--were: Giannis Alevras, Pan. Kanellopoulos, Giannis Degiannis, and G. Mavros.

The possibility of advancing A. Papandreou to the presidency in April has been ruled out for two reasons--despite the strong desire of the premier's family--as follows:

1. Because of the small majority PASOK and KKE have together (181) in the Chamber of Deputies /Vouli/, the election is uncertain. Papandreou's prestige 'will be terribly hurt' in the event he fails to win.
2. The party apparatus believes that Papandreou must lead PASOK in the coming electoral contest whenever it takes place, since 'only the present premier can win for PASOK another 4-year term in power.'

Thus, discussions have focused on the four aforementioned prospective candidates. The pros and cons assessed in the confidential meetings at the premier's residence at Kastri regarding each of the candidates, are approximately as follows:

1. Alevras: He is the "natural" candidate of PASOK since Papandreou does not claim the presidency at this moment. His supporters say "he is PASOK's K. Tsatsos." He is moderate, with signs of above-party attitude as president of the Vouli. Giannis Alevras a) can win the votes of all PASOK and KKE deputies in the Vouli; b) he would not cause a strong negative reaction on the side of the opposition; c) his candidacy, whether approved or not by the present Vouli, will not "scare" the centrist voters of PASOK in the parliamentary election that will follow; and d) Alevras would be willing to resign the moment conditions are regarded as appropriate for Papandreou to assume the presidency.

The only, but basic, disadvantage of Alevras is that the first PASOK candidate for the presidency will not have the intellectual brilliance of Mikh. Stasinopoulos and Kon. Tsatsos or the political prestige and appeal of Kon. Karamanlis--the "three presidents of the Right."

2. Pan. Kanellopoulos, as one of the candidates, turns the "Alevras disadvantage" into a plus, but his candidacy is not considered for that reason alone. The major advantages PASOK expects from the candidacy of Kanellopoulos are: a) his certain election in the event ND, too, not wishing to have an early election in the spring, agrees to vote for him; b) an extension of the "sense of security" of the conservative masses, due to the impression that the presidency will be in the hands of someone who can tame the exuberant moves and impulsive actions of the "charismatic premier; and c) the support of Kanellopoulos' candidacy will verify in practice the centrist opening of PASOK so much more since Kanellopoulos had been supported in 1975 by Center Union/New Forces /EKND/ as an opponent to K. Tsatsos for the presidency.

Yet, from the point of view of PASOK's hardliners, the Kanellopoulos' advantages turn into disadvantages. Specifically, the support of a personality outside of PASOK is considered as a confession of weakness on the part of PASOK. Moreover, the prospect of a voluntary resignation and replacement by Papandreou is out. Cooperation with ND for the election of Kanellopoulos does not serve in the same degree the political expediency for supporting Karamanlis and, therefore, it maximizes the ideological inconsistency of such an action.

The mention of Giannis Degiannis as a third candidate obviously aims at bridging the advantages and disadvantages which are apparent in the candidacies of Alevras and Kanellopoulos.

3. G. Degiannis has greater intellectual brilliance than G. Alevras but certainly not as much as that of Pan. Kanellopoulos. He does not enjoy much trust from the party and Papandreou, but more trust than that enjoyed by Kanellopoulos

In any event, according to a PASOK leading personality, G. Degiannis, in the 3 years of his political career, "did not justify PASOK's expectations nor did he confirm the prestige he had gained as a judge."

4. Finally, the candidacy of G. Mavros has the least number of supporters and the weakest arguments in its favor. His candidacy is being discussed only in the event PASOK urgently needs a certain "certificate of loyalty" or "contact link" to the West.

Something of the sort could happen if the reports about an immediate and drastic escalation of an "anti-Greek policy" during Reagan's second term were borne out. But even in this case there is negative reaction to the candidacy of Mavros.

As the same PASOK leading cadre said, "since we declined to entrust the Foreign Ministry to Mavros during the first cabinet reshuffling, how can we nominate him for the highest office in the state?"

All these discussions in PASOK are very far from resulting in some agreement. "Their only positive element," according to a close associate of the premier, "is that they help the acceptance by all within PASOK of the Papandreou view that there is no better solution than Karamanlis."

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CSO 3521/104

RIXI MEMBERS INTERVIEWED: ALL REVOLUTIONARY METHODS ACCEPTABLE

Athens ENA in Greek 20 Dec 84 pp 24-28

[Interview with RIXI members by ENA writer Giorgos Trangas, date and place not given]

[Excerpts] The extra-parliamentary Left's political group, RIXI, has come into the spotlight in recent days with the repeated clashes between the police and anarchists in the center of Athens. Scores of young demonstrators fled to the offices of the magazine, RIXI, which are housed in an old two-story building at 37 Themistokleous Street. There they were laid siege to and arrested by MAT [Units for the Restoration of Order] and MEA [National Defense Units]. The magazine's publisher, 38-year-old Giorgos Karambelias, was driven to the public prosecutor's office along with members of the magazine's editorial staff. Since 1979, this magazine has represented in its writings the inclinations of the area of the extra-parliamentary Left in Greece. Karambelias and Khristina Stamato-poulou, a member of the RIXI political group, have been suspected of participating in the "17 November". However, no data confirming this suspicion have ever been found. In their exclusive interview with ENA, given to Giorgos Trangas, people from the magazine (and group), RIXI, answer the accusations and develop their positions on critical questions.

ENA: How do you think people from RIXI, and, more generally, the area of the extra-parliamentary Left, will achieve the "revolutionary end"?

Stamatopoulou: Many of us, the older ones, who supported the movement of the 60's, are identified with the movement of armed struggle, of change, that is, through revolution, not with enrollment and incorporation in the system supported by reformist parties. Today, I believe, things have advanced very much. I would say our model is the self-organization of the Polish "Solidarity," but also the revolutionary movements promoted in Third World countries, such as Nicaragua. We do not exclude armed struggle, but this option must have the broad assent of the popular masses.

Karambelias: Our model, what we call a revolutionary end, is that which leads to a society with less government, a society of the people's self-management. For this reason we believe, as concerns methods, that a revolutionary movement utilizes all kinds of methods. We have no prejudice on this. We believe that, according to the possibilities opened to the masses, all methods can be utilized. An armed revolution is armed only at the moment it occurs.

ENA: Do you agree with the strategy of the Red Brigades, Baader-Meinhoff and the other armed organizations which have acted and are acting in various countries of the West?

G. Kotsou: We believe it is a history which is ending. It is a phenomenon and result of the blows received by the various movements after 1968 in Western Europe, a phenomenon created by certain people who, seeing the battle being lost on other planes, created or enlisted in armed groups in order to confront the government. Thus, they built a logic of another government, versus the government of the parties, the social state which prevailed in Western Europe. But government found the opportunity to hit the movement, and its authoritarianism was sharpened particularly in Italy and West Germany. Naturally, these organizations were doomed by their very nature. And, in any case, we must distinguish them from the IRA, Palestinians, and the other national-liberation organizations.

Stamatopoulou: These movements had only a military perception of confrontation with the state. And there we are always the losers if the appropriate conditions do not exist. This does not mean we are against armed confrontation. This moment sometimes arrives. But the broad assent of the masses is needed. Otherwise, the government exploits the activity of these organizations in order to develop the mechanisms of suppression.

Karambelias: They have repeatedly tried to identify us with this kind of actions. Every time they arrest us, they ask us to accuse those who hurled the bombs or did some specific act. And we answered that we did not hurl the bombs, but we cannot accuse--and we are not obliged to do so--those for whom they are searching. Since we did not make accusations, we received the answer: Then you are the terrorists. The Security police cannot dupe us into the logic of accusing those things being discussed within the movement. Besides, our silence has to do not only with the movement's internal matters, but also with the lack of respect towards our basic rights during the arrest, bodily search and interrogation.

ENA: A list of "14 primary suspects" for participation in "17 November" was published in a newspaper. Among them were two names from RIXI, that of Karambelias and Stamatopoulou. What is your opinion about the activity of "17 November"?

Karambelias: Terrorism, as an answer to the coercion of the state, is produced by the state itself. For example, in West Germany in 1968, the movement faced 3,000 trials in one year. The answer of one segment of the movement to this blow was to drag confrontation to a military level. That is, in the final analysis, it fell into the trap to which the state led it. The same is true for the organizations which have appeared in Greece. We consider the opinion that "17 November" is a rightist organization ridiculous. We believe that it represents the segment of those people in the movement who have been driven to such rationalities. We have made an effort for a long time with writings in the magazine to persuade them they are following a mistaken path. The specific publication of the list in the newspaper is part of the whole "thread" of provocation.

ENA: Some people maintain that the CIA or KGB may be behind these armed groups.

Karambelias: We had two phases in the terrorism in Europe. In the first phase, it was bound with the mass movements. In the second, it was cut away and there

was a decrease in the members in its groups which began to shrink and wither. We believe that from a certain point on, certain forces have an interest in terrorism being maintained. That is, the moment the movement tends to get over this sickness, a way of maintaining it will have to be devised. We believe that, from that moment on, it is possible there are isolated cases of groups and actions directed by centers--by the KGB, which has made a great infiltration into Western Europe in recent years, and by the CIA which since long ago has thoroughly utilized such actions. Up to now, only the CIA has been brought up and the KGB and its role in the Popieluszko assassination and the attempt to murder the pope are forgotten. Intermeddlings of the secret services are always possible.

ENA: You have been accused from the Left of playing the game of conservatism and the KKE newspapers have repeatedly written that you are agents of imperialist forces.

Kotsou: They are slinging mud because to their own over-informing about happenings in eastern countries we juxtapose information...

ENA: Do you exclude the infiltration of secret services in your own area?

Karambelias: We consider it impossible because of the political objects we promote and our open activity.

ENA: How do you view the methods of struggle and strategic choices the two communist parties are using in this period in Greece?

Karambelias: We have a basic opposition, a fundamental one we would say, with the KKE. We are opposed to the model of the eastern societies--a model in which there is no freedom for the workers and which is reproducing a new class structure, a new class oppression. In relation to the West it has one difference: It does not offer the possibility for struggle to the workers. While in the West we have a society of oppression and exploitation, where there are possibilities for struggle--even though acquired through two centuries of endeavors--in the eastern countries the workers possess only job security but have no freedom and suffer the oppression of a managing ruling class which prevails there. To the degree that the KKE expresses such a model--and has direct dependencies from there--our opposition is obvious. We also have oppositions touching on everyday matters and the KKE's direct relation with Greek affairs. For example, its contact with the workers is a bureaucratic type of relation. For them, it is the party which knows--the people who do not know. They have a logic which is expressed in all the mass areas (student, labor, syndicalist, etc.) with the party's monopolizing and in no case with the independence of individuals. What always comes forward is the interests of some party mechanism, not the people's interest.

ENA: The KKE's party mechanism is staffed, however, by people who come from the popular base. Do you believe that these individuals, passing through the party mechanism, are differentiated and belong now to another class?

Karambelias: In Greece we have a clear example: Most Greek capitalists, the bosses, have started out as workers. And often they are more atrocious

exploiters than others who have come from higher strata. The origin or previous position has no significance, nor does it allow any indulgence. Brezhnev's 40 Rolls Royces are not justified by the fact he was once a worker.

ENA: What is your opinion about the KKE Interior's choices?

Karambelias: It is significant that the KKE(Int) does not concur absolutely with the eastern model, without having differentiated itself decisively from it, however, which is something we see in all its positionings. It simply maintains a critical stance in the frameworks of a partnership. And, of course, for the KKE(Int), as is true for the KKE, in no case does it have the power to drag away from the western model. It is not a political power because, I believe, its social staff and its machinery are a part of the present Greek capitalist system and cannot leave it. Even if its cadres want some change, they are not willing to cause the conflicts needed for there to be some change.

ENA: Nevertheless, the KKE Interior's disengagement from the Soviet model and Moscow's influence is clear.

Karambelias: This is happening with all the communist parties in Western Europe, except the Portuguese and Greek. They have been forced, based on the realities of their societies, to distance themselves from the Soviet model. This model can still take hold in countries which have to solve problems of immediate survival, but the European worker, who already has a higher standard of living than that of the eastern countries and certain freedoms, has no intention of giving them up to any Chernenko. And, with the passage of time, the majority of Greek workers will become aware of this fact.

9247

CSO: 3521/128

CONSERVATIVES CONFIDENT ON ELECTION YEAR EVE

Membership Growth Larger than Labor's

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Terje Svabo]

[Text] The Conservative Party is getting started. The biggest government party has again stepped up its recruitment apparatus. In the last half year the Conservatives have signed up 9884 new members. The Labor Party acquired 7500 for the entire year. This means that the Conservative Party is about to regain its place as Norway's biggest membership party. Today both the Conservatives and the Labor Party have around 180,000 members. Conservative chairman Erling Norvik gives the party's local level the credit for these gains.

The figures are very encouraging for the Conservatives after the party had to note a decline in membership last year. Therefore it is not surprising that those in the party ranks feel much more positively about the possibility of mounting a good election campaign than they did just a few months ago.

It should make the Labor Party stop and think that the biggest government party is recruiting more people than the dominant opposition party. The natural laws of politics would indicate that the Labor Party should make organizational gains in the opposition role. This seems to be true only to a limited extent.

In addition there are opinion polls that show that we could have an extremely close election next September. People in government circles feel that most of the unpopular moves are behind the Willoch government in this election period and that the foundation is in place for an offensive election campaign on the part of the government.

The Labor Party made gains in the polls after the party joined the opposition but not enough so the party can take an election victory for granted. It must be disturbing for the Labor Party that it has not managed to make bigger gains in spite of a series of very harsh attacks on government policy.

Conservative chairman Erling Norvik said in a commentary to AFTENPOSTEN that the recruiting figures show that things are going very well. He said the increase in activity and the offensive attitude that has reappeared at the local level have contributed to the results.

"After we have rested up over the Christmas and New Year's holidays we will resume the escalation. The Conservatives will go into action with the goal of recruiting 10,000 new members. There is a lot of optimism but we are maintaining a sober attitude. The Conservative voters and sympathizers are the ones who must lay the foundation for further gains through their work," Erling Norvik said.

Scholar: Conservative Wave Continuing

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 Dec 84 p 3

[Interview with Professor Henry Valen by Bjorn Talen]

[Text] The two government blocs are so evenly matched that it is impossible to make any predictions about the outcome of the election. The parties' efforts in the campaign and which issues are dominant will be the deciding factors. The conservative wave still exists and in the future we could have an intensified ideological climate. Two alternatives will gradually take shape--a return to higher tax levels in order to pay for the common benefits or a strong emphasis on private enterprise as a way of solving the problems. That is what our most distinguished election researcher, Professor Henry Valen, maintained in a talk with AFTENPOSTEN.

[Valen] Some of my colleagues say that it makes no difference who wins the election. Policies will be the same either way. The current government has shown that this is not true. This is not a question of blurred ideological distinctions.

[Question] The opinion polls suggest that the government parties, especially the Conservative Party, have lost some voter confidence to the Labor Party on a good many issues. But at the same time the voters still seem to reject centrally-directed and collective solutions. Doesn't this indicate that there are voter trends going in both directions?

[Answer] The conservative wave has not weakened much. Otherwise the Conservative Party would be far weaker than just 2-3 percentage points below the party's 1981 election results. It is quite a feat for the party to be doing so well. It is hard to say how long the liberal mood will last. But the conservative wave still exists both in Norway and in other countries. Just look at the presidential election in the United States.

Imbalance

We have a strange situation with great public poverty in which urgent problems are not being solved while at the same time we have considerable private prosperity. In the long run this imbalance will lead to two clear political alternatives--either we will have to return to higher taxes in order to get the funds to pay for the common public benefits or we will have to stress an increased privatization in order to solve the problems. If the second alternative is chosen it will mean substantial changes in society.

Many thought it was possible to lower taxes while at the same time retaining all the welfare benefits. That is not the case.

[Question] But surely it is not the few billions the government has provided in tax relief that have caused all the problems in the health-care system.

[Answer] No, I will not take a stand on how that gap arose and who is to blame for it. After all this is a development that has been going on for many years.

Public Angry

[Question] A big survey from NOI [Norwegian Public Opinion Institute] that AFTENPOSTEN published recently showed that the government parties have less confidence than the Labor Party when it comes to the health and social sectors. Does this feeling run deep or is this an erosion that would happen to any government?

[Answer] Cancer patients who have to go on a waiting list before they can get an operation are unlikely to think of who is responsible. They are angry. And naturally that anger will be directed at the government in power. People see there is something wrong when we have had a violent expansion in the health and social budgets while at the same time there has been no reduction in the long lines. The public has to react to things like that.

The proportion of elderly people in society will increase and the needs in this area will inevitably grow. Regardless of the political color of the government, we will have to make a real effort here.

Incidentally the Labor Party will probably profit if social policy and employment dominate the campaign. But if tax policy and the Tax Commission are in the limelight it is hard to say who will benefit. I still think that an NOI poll from 1983 is valid. It showed that 40 percent of the people thought the government had not provided enough tax relief.

Unemployment Important

[Question] Doesn't experience from other countries, for instance Great Britain, show that a government can survive in spite of record unemployment figures? There is much to suggest that if a government takes care of growth and greater prosperity for the majority it will win no matter what.

[Answer] Unemployment was not a new phenomenon in Great Britain. The voters had seen this condition under a variety of governments. However unemployment is something new in Norway. As late as 1981 our studies showed that voters did not fear rising unemployment and that they were not especially concerned about it as a political issue. Studies in 1983 warned of growing fear and awareness. Unless jobless figures decline markedly in the months ahead this will undoubtedly have an important effect on the election outcome and this is the most important and least stable voter group.

[Question] Although this is not unique in Europe, the government has managed to cut price increases in half. Will that have any impact on the election?

[Answer] I don't think so. Inflation figures do not seem to have any significant influence on the party people vote for.

Progressives May Take Votes

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 May 84 p 3

[Interview with Professor Henry Valen by Bjorn Talen]

[Text] The Progressive Party is the joker in the election, in the opinion of Henry Valen, who also thinks the Center Party has more of a future than the Liberals. In time the Labor Party will benefit from the fact that there is now peace in the party.

[Question] The Progressives were the election winners last year. But won't it be more difficult this time, both because their message is no longer so new and because next year's Storting election will be largely a contest between two government alternatives?

[Answer] No, I think the Progressive Party's chances are good. The party does not have a press and as before it will benefit greatly from the exposure provided by an election campaign. In the large group of undecided voters between the Conservative and Progressive parties there are many who are disappointed in the Conservative Party. Voter expectations will always be higher than the level any political party can live up to. In addition the Conservatives are much more moderate in a ruling position than the impression the voters had of the party when it was in the opposition.

The Progressive Party could be a decisive force after the Storting election and that could lead to a lot of wear and tear for the Conservatives who will feel tempted to yield to pressure from its right flank.

[Question] When the Labor Party ruled with the support of the Socialist-Left Party (SV) in the 1970's, SV turned out to have little impact. Do the three current ruling parties have to pay more attention to the Progressive Party, which is unlikely to want to topple a nonsocialist government?

[Answer] I think it could be extremely difficult both for the Conservatives and for the middle parties. The Christian People's Party and the Center Party feel that there is an enormous ideological distance between them and the Progressive Party.

[Question] Won't the middle parties be in a bind anyway if there is going to be an intensified ideological conflict between collective and private-sector solutions, as you suggested?

[Answer] These parties define their profiles in other areas. Their fate is unconditionally determined by relations between the two major parties which are both moderate on either side of the center. But their flank parties, SV and the Progressive Party, pull them away from the center and that provides more room in the middle.

[Question] The polls predict a bleak future for the Center Party. Is that inevitable now?

[Answer] Some of the Center losses were due to the defection of prosperous proprietors of medium-sized farms. By satisfying many of the farm demands, the Center Party actually sawed off the branch the party was sitting on.

But the Center Party is concerned with village culture in general and not just with the lot of farmers. Therefore an intensified conflict between rural districts and the cities could lead to new gains for the party. Urban problems have suddenly captured the spotlight. City dwellers, who for many years contributed to the big transfers to rural districts, are now demanding a reversal. The Center Party could stand as the defender of rural interests and win back voter support. Nothing remains the same in politics.

[Question] Would it help the Center Party if it was not part of a government coalition?

[Answer] It would automatically make it easier for the party to outline a clear profile. But at the same time it would provide a lot of ammunition against the Center Party, which would be blamed for the lack of nonsocialist cooperation. Something similar happened to the Liberal Party in 1965. The party had strong misgivings about entering a government coalition with the Conservatives. But the Liberals also knew that nonsocialist voters wanted a change in government very strongly. Therefore the party did not dare to refuse. Coalitions have a dynamic all their own.

Dangerous for Liberal Party

[Question] The Liberal Party has now decided to change sides. Is the party digging its own grave? Or can the Liberals soar to new heights through a co-operation with the Labor Party?

[Answer] The Liberals will not regain their old heights at any rate. All the middle parties can probably win voters who are not happy about cooperating

with the Conservatives. But the party is also running a considerable risk with its peripheral support, especially in Vestlandet which provided both the Liberal Storting seats.

The air has also gone out of the green balloon, either because the green values have been espoused by all the parties or because unemployment and economic problems have led people to put a priority on growth. Production ceilings are no longer a controversial issue in the area of oil policy.

Greater Labor Voter Stability

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Dec 84 p 3

[Text] Some 85 percent of those who voted for the Labor Party in the 1981 Storting election would vote for the same party if we had an election tomorrow. Some 70 percent of those who voted for the Conservatives in 1981 would vote that way again, in other words the stability of these voters is not as high as that of voters for the biggest opposition party. The November poll from Gallup/NOI also showed more shifts in relation to a similar poll in November [as published], but the agency itself stressed that the figures for the smaller parties are not reliable.

In October, 83 percent of those who voted for the Labor Party in 1981 said they would vote for the party again while Conservative stability was 70 percent last month too. The results for the other five parties, with the October percentages in parentheses, are as follows: Progressive Party, 48 (68), Christian People's Party, 73 (83), Center Party, 66 (72), Liberal Party, 55 (77) and Socialist-Left Party, 62 (76).

There is so little substantiating material for the Progressives, the Socialist-Left, the Liberals and the Center Party that individual monthly surveys for these parties are not reliable.

If we look at the long-term trend for the Conservative and Labor parties, we can draw the conclusion that the Labor Party seems to have a far more stable voter group than the Conservatives. In the 1984 monthly surveys the Labor Party has had a peak of 91 percent and a low reading of 82 percent. The Conservative Party's top figure was 74 percent while 67 percent was its lowest figure.

Of the roughly 1000 people interviewed 60 percent would vote for the same party again as they voted for in the 1981 election. Only 4 percent were quite certain that they would vote for a different party while 8 percent said they might vote for another party. It should be of interest to politicians that 21 percent said they are still uncertain which party should get their votes. And 7 percent had decided not to vote.

Uncertainty is very high among young voters under 30 years of age. In this group only 32 percent said they would vote for the same party as they voted for in the last Storting election. In view of the voter support the Conservatives had from young voters this response will undoubtedly not please anyone at Conservative headquarters.

A substantial 43 percent of voters under 30 were uncertain which party they would vote for next time. This is obviously a voter group in search of something, for only 4 percent were sure they would vote for a different party from the one they voted for last time. Some 8 percent might vote for another party and 12 percent did not intend to vote at all.

There were minor shifts in voter stability in relation to income and place of residence.

Election of 'Clear Political Alternatives'

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Egil Sundar]

[Text] By and large we have come unscathed through Orwell's 1984. And more than that, Norway is on its way out of stagflation--the peculiar combination of stagnation and inflation that was a product of the policies of the 1970's which led to profound problems on the labor market. Now things are definitely going in the right direction. As we go into a new year--the 1985 election year--we can note clear upward tendencies in vital area of the Norwegian economy and business sector. Norway leads Europe when it comes to employment growth.

As far as domestic policy is concerned the 1985 election year will probably be a much bigger challenge than the Orwellian year of 1984. The overshadowing question which is coming closer every day is whether we will still have a nonsocialist government after the election on 9 September or whether the socialists will resume power with Gro Harlem Brundtland as prime minister. Under any circumstances we are facing a trendsetting election of decisive importance for future social developments.

Balance of Power

If we look at the balance of power between parties as shown in the opinion polls for the last 9 months it is obvious that the socialist bloc has lost ground to some extent. It is true that the Labor Party has consolidated its position with a support level of around 39-40 percent, but this will hardly satisfy the election strategists in Youngstorvet. Our biggest opposition

party--which has been in a strong offensive attack position since September--should be well over the 40-percent level at this time, in the view of many people, in order to substantiate any objective optimism. But that also presupposes that the Labor Party's two support parties, the Socialist-Left Party and the Liberal Party, manage to hold their positions. The latest polls have shown a declining tendency for both these parties.

Striking Stability

But even so, the major characteristic of the balance of power between the nonsocialist and socialist blocs is a striking stability and evenness. With the small margin that separates them it would not take much to shift things in favor of one bloc or the other. The latest polls have shown some advantage for the nonsocialist parties in general, i.e. the government parties, the Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party along with the Progressives. According to the latest political barometer from Norwegian Market Data, the nonsocialist parties had total support of 49.9 percent compared to 48.4 percent for the socialists. This confirms that the two blocs are so evenly matched that it is impossible to predict the outcome of the election on this basis alone.

Remarkable

However an analysis of the political development as we head into the new year suggests that time is not working for the Labor Party or for a socialist election victory. It is quite remarkable that several months of intense attacks on parts of the government's policy, mainly in the areas of health care and social policy and employment, have had little or no impact as far as the Labor Party is concerned. And this despite the fact that a majority of the voters--according to a very extensive opinion poll here in AFTENPOSTEN--seem to feel that a Labor government would handle these problems better than the current government. But if this factor had been important in terms of party preference, the Conservative Party, the biggest of the government parties, would be substantially lower in the polls than it is.

Consequently we must draw the conclusion that other factors and trends besides these are decisive for the party selection of large groups of voters. As our most distinguished election researcher, Professor Henry Valen, pointed out recently in an interview in AFTENPOSTEN, the conservative wave is still a reality. A number of the elements that led to the nonsocialist election victory in 1981 are obviously still valid today.

New Attitudes

This is probably closely connected with the fact that basic political attitudes have changed over the years, primarily for sociological reasons. To put it simply, the steady rise in prosperity over several decades has produced a different type of voter at the polls today than when the Labor Party was at the height of its power. Labor voters have also gradually developed new interests and needs, simply because economic and social conditions are different than they used to be.

Dilemma

This reality presents the Labor Party with its biggest dilemma today in the formation and presentation of party policy. A policy more or less inspired by socialist dogmas and ideas has little chance of making an impact on a majority of the electorate in this day and age.

In its proposal for a new Storting election program the Labor Party has gone a long way in trying to take this into account. At least on paper. But an important point remains, namely tax policy. We will not know what the Labor Party thinks about such things as tax progression and interest ceilings until after the national council discusses these matters later this winter. It is understandable that party organs take their time. The Labor Party's move will determine whether we have a new vital tax debate with marked disagreements as we approach the election, a debate we have had many times in the past. It is likely that the whole thing will end in a tax policy revival. The Conservatives would certainly have nothing against that.

Noncommittal

Diplomatic and relatively noncommittal statements in the draft of a new Storting election program really say little about the Labor Party's policy in practice. Like any other party the Labor Party must be assessed on the basis of its concrete proposals and the party's behavior in everyday politics. It is true that the program draft is generally characterized by moderate tones--and is well-adapted in that respect to the expectations of a modern Social Democratic party. But after the program draft was presented by Gro Harlem Brundtland at a broadly-based--and well-prepared--press conference in September, the Labor Party later documented that nothing has really changed and that no important changes in attitude have taken place.

Inflationary Policy

The fall budget discussion in Storting was fresh confirmation that the Labor Party--despite all assurances to the contrary--wants to continue the inflationary policy that is the main reason why tens of thousands of jobs have been lost in the first half of the 1980's. Finance Minister Rolf Presthus made a frontal attack on this policy when he had the floor in the budget balance debate in Storting just before Christmas. Pursuing such an expansive economic policy as the one outlined by the Labor Party would seriously jeopardize the positive development we are now seeing, the finance minister stated. He summed up his views as follows:

"Taken as a whole the Labor Party's plans would lead to mounting price and cost increases. This would weaken our competitiveness. It would reduce employment in the sectors of Norwegian business that are affected by competition. It would sidetrack developments in the Norwegian economy once more."

Labor Party and NATO

Even more disturbing--from a national viewpoint--is the uncertainty and unrest the Labor Party has created on the basic premises for the Norwegian alliance policy. In spite of the fact that we achieved a broad security policy agreement in the spring which stressed Norway's alliances as the central and sustaining element, we later experienced militant moves by the Labor Party with respect to the content of the latest freeze proposal in the United Nations and on a ratified nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region. Under the agreement it is an express prerequisite that such zones must be evaluated in light of NATO strategy and as part of a broader European solution. But the strange thing is that each time Labor leaders go somewhere and talk about these matters they hardly mention our NATO commitments. As the party's vice chairman, Einar Forde, put it: "If we want to establish a Nordic nuclear-free zone we must realistically count on some infighting in NATO." So now we know that.

Election Theme

After that there is no doubt that only the Labor Party itself can remove the unrest over security policy. But the clarification should come soon. Otherwise it will be unavoidable that the disagreement over security policy will be a major theme in the election campaign. And in reality only the fringe parties want that.

As the election approaches and most people take a stand on the existing alternatives, political credibility will be put to the test. This of course applies to the Labor Party, our biggest opposition party, just as much as it does to the three government parties, both individually and as a cooperative political group. If the Labor Party is to recapture government power, it must be able to convince the voters that the policy the party is pursuing in the opposition is best suited to deal with the problems and insure the nation a stable development as we head into the 1990's. With his remarks earlier in this article Finance Minister Rolf Presthus vividly showed how this debate might develop. And if the Labor Party continues its security policy hovering we can assume that everyone will ask if a government policy based on these--at best--unclear premises can be said to be in the national interest.

Putting Out Fires

What about the government itself? Like any other government it must stand and fall on its own actions, of course. Since the government changeover in 1981 first the Conservative government and later the three-party coalition have had to concentrate to a large extent on putting out fires before taking hold of the most extensive economic restoration in modern times. This work is gradually beginning to produce results in a growing number of areas. Clear upward tendencies can be noted in large parts of the Norwegian economy and business life, something that is also making a significant impact on the labor market where unemployment figures are going down sharply.

Economic Upturn

As we start the new year we can note that the economic upturn is continuing while inflation is being further reduced. The economic policy the Willoch government has pursued for the last 3 years has made it possible to turn the negative economic development we were experiencing. Industrial production has shown marked growth and the same is true of investments in major industrial branches.

It is true that a lot remains to be done before we can be quite satisfied, for one thing cost levels are still too high. But the main conclusion is that the Norwegian economy is clearly improving thanks to the government's determination to pursue a long-range and consistent economic policy. Therefore the question in the election on 9 September next year will be whether the government should be given a mandate to continue the line that is necessary to put the Norwegian economy back on its feet.

Growth and Security

It is the welfare state, the security of the individual, that is really at stake. We must have a bigger pie in order to cut off bigger pieces for those who do not have enough. That is what politicians mean when they talk about the necessity of economic growth. Under any circumstances we need economic resources in order to further expand social welfare functions and meet the need for medical services and care.

6578

CSO: 3639/50

MAJOR CITES SHORTCOMINGS IN ARMED FORCES MATERIEL

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 December 84 p 8

[Op Ed Article by Major J. J. Graabæk: "Ambitions of Navy"]

[Text] It looks as if the Navy has plunged into a campaign to preserve the past. An apparently endless number of articles in favor of frigates and submarines is being launched and published in large quantities. The whole thing appears like a major and one-sided public relations campaign for the types of ships in question.

That, of course, is all right. Personally, I would, however, have preferred for all of these, incidentally, good contributions to the debate to have concerned all of the services and to have contained proposals regarding the future situation of the Danish Armed Forces.

It would be a delusion to believe that there is only one way of defending oneself. It would, of course, be easiest to maintain the existing defense structure, but it must be admitted that there is no economic basis for doing so.

The reason is simply that the price level of modern weapons systems increases at a faster rate than the budget. At the same time, the rate of increase in the price level is reinforced, to an unreasonable extent, by the increased complexity of the composition of the materiel.

The problem is referred to as the economic dilemma of the technological development, and it is initially the small nations which are affected by it.

It, therefore, would have been valuable for the people who display such great imagination in defending frigates and submarines also to have made their knowledge available, as far as realistic alternatives to the present situation are concerned.

Of course, one may close one's eyes to the facts. However, the longer one keeps one's eyes closed, the ruder the eventual awakening becomes.

And the awakening will occur!

It will, of course, be impossible within the scope of this article to examine in detail the problems within the Danish Armed Forces. On the other hand, it would be reasonable to elucidate the present situation through a few examples. I shall therefore quote the following from the periodical FORSVAR I DAG in connection with the recent NATO maneuver BOLD GANNET.

"As far as training was concerned, we certainly could match our guests. Only as far as materiel was concerned, we have to recognize that we are somewhat behind. In a number of areas where our Allied have managed to undertake a continuous modernization, we, unfortunately, have obsolete materiel, a problem which, even with the best political intentions, it will take at least a decade to alleviate."

It is a question of the experiences of a small Danish tank squadron in connection with the maneuver. Probably not without a bit of jealousy, it is mentioned that "all of the British intelligence and reconnaissance vehicles are equipped with light intensification equipment, enabling them to see (and fight) in the dark. The British full-track vehicles are, furthermore, specially protected against war gases, and British soldiers have been provided with special suits which protect them against war gases."

It is, furthermore, stated that "the air defense is one of the very vulnerable areas of the Danish Armed Forces. It, therefore, was impressive to see the way the British forces were constantly covered by air defense missile units of the Rapier type."

The lack of air defenses, the lack of anti-tank defenses and obsolete equipment. Although this does not apply to all areas, it is, however, the situation of the Danish Armed Forces in general. One may then ask oneself who will have to take the responsibility for sending approximately 100,000 young people and approximately 70,000 home-guard people into a combat situation without sufficient protection against modern, destructive weapons from the air and without sufficient anti-tank defenses for protection against the tanks of the enemy. Even if the enlisted privates of the Armed Forces have shown that they are the best ones within NATO, will they be able to carry through fighting in the night without having sufficient amounts of the right equipment for that purpose?

Also the Air Force has got problems. It is true that the F-16 is a splendid aircraft. All of this is not very helpful if one does not have the right weapons to attach to the aircraft.

Another problem for the Air Force is the defense of air bases. What we have is not sufficient, and it is not without reason that NATO officers are concerned whether we may be able to ensure that reinforcements may be flown in. A third problem for the Air Force are air surveillance systems, which primarily consist of fixed installations. For how long will fixed radar installations be capable of functioning in a modern war?

The Naval Defense also is in a tight corner in a vast number of areas. Some motor torpedo-boats, minesweepers and guard-boats need to be replaced. In general, the Naval Defense needs new air defense equipment for ships, etc.

The list of shortcomings is alarmingly long. On the other hand, it should be noted that the defense agreement recently entered into remedies the worst shortcomings for the time being. They are thus in the process of putting things right. Among other things, for that reason, it is a good agreement.

All of the problems mentioned here will, of course, also be included in the debate on frigates and submarines.

Incidentally, a new 3,000 tons frigate costs approximately 3 billion kroner. A new submarine costs approximately 600 million kroner. To this comes that the two old submarines we have left will also have to be modernized.

If we were to have two new frigates, three new submarines and would have to modernize the two old submarines, the costs would amount to somewhere between 8 and 9 billion kroner.

Even if it would not be a question of new frigates, the cost of air defense systems and new electronic equipment for the existing vessels would be considerable.

In this connection, one should bear in mind that electronic systems account for approximately half of the cost of 3 billion kroner of a new frigate.

Whichever way one looks at it, the cost of new submarines and frigates will be considerable. Some will probably claim that it can all be done at a lower cost.

It will, no doubt, be possible to discuss this from many angles.

The fact will remain, however, that it will be a question of several billion kroner.

As long as we maintain the old doctrinaire structure of the Armed Forces, the financial resources for the individual services will keep decreasing. The situation is quite difficult. For the amount available remains the same.

If one agrees with the energetic writers who want frigates and submarines, the Army and the Air Force on land will not get the materiel and the weapons systems which they need. Conversely, we shall not have an advanced defense, i.e., we shall not have any frigates and submarines.

As will be seen, the solution reached in the defense agreement was not too bad after all. By omitting the frigates and renting some submarines, considerable amounts of money will be saved. These amounts may improve the materiel situation on land--at the same time as a relatively low-cost advanced defense will be retained.

The fact that the Naval Defense is not satisfied is merely deplorable. It should be natural first and foremost to secure one's own land area--the so-called land behind. Once this has been done and is in order, one may

consider whether there are funds for an advanced defense.

The entire discussion on frigates and submarines will have to be viewed on the basis of the fact that the Danish Armed Forces--despite their small size--are sharply divided into three services, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The individual services keep an eye on the working tasks, economic possibilities, etc., of the other services. This balance among the services, which they officially deny exists, makes it largely impossible to undertake inter-service savings which may involve that the tasks of one service are transferred to another service. It seems entirely impossible if the savings mean that a certain weapons platform, for example submarines, is affected.

Incidentally, it is my impression that one of the most splendid and promising projects we have seen in this country was developed by the Naval Defense. It is the new type of vessel that is called the "Standard Flex 300." It is a ship which may change its role through an exchange of weapons systems and other equipment. Put in simple terms, the same vessel may one day be a missile-carrying vessel, the next day a surveillance vessel and finally the third day a minesweeper. The ships are built in Denmark.

That, too, is part of the defense agreement.

7262

CSO: 3613/63

AMBASSADOR THEORIN SEEN VICTOR IN ARMS EXPORT POLICY FIGHT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 20 Nov 84 p 2

[Editorial: "A Victory for the Ambassador"]

[Text] At the Social Democratic Party's congress in 1981, Maj-Britt Theorin, now an ambassador, was able to push through a proposal that Swedish arms exports be made subject to parliamentary decisionmaking power over such exports and that an annual report be submitted to Parliament.

The Social Democratic Party Board recommended rejection of the proposal, saying:

"Naturally, it would be possible theoretically to establish a special government body with a board for handling arms export questions.

"But the party board considers it inappropriate for two reasons. First and foremost, arms export questions often involve problems related to foreign, economic, defense, and industrial policy. It must be left to the government to make the final decision on such questions, not to a central authority. Second, a system involving a board made up entirely of politically appointed laymen would mean a departure from the existing basic rules for the makeup of government boards."

Now the government has capitulated to Ambassador Theorin--not completely, to be sure, but halfway: Government Bill No 1984/85:82 includes a proposal to establish an advisory committee on war materiel matters to begin operating on 1 January 1985.

This is an unnecessary committee, as is evident even from the government's explanatory statement.

The committee is coming into existence solely and exclusively to satisfy Ambassador Theorin. Does anyone believe that she will be satisfied with this first step?

True, it may sound enticingly democratic to ask that exports of war materiel be subject to parliamentary control--as though the government, being at least tolerated by the majority in Parliament, were not parliamentary. (Is a special government-appointed advisory committee more parliamentary than the government itself?)

It also sounds enticingly democratic to demand parliamentary control (and in this context, the word "parliamentary" is being misused) over war materiel exports and an accounting of those exports to Parliament.

How hard it is to oppose those simple and so-democratic proposals for control!

It can be said that half the battle is won simply by making such demands. The strong arguments against "parliamentary decisionmaking power" that were put forward by the Social Democratic Party Board in 1981 carry little weight against the catchword politics involved in "parliamentary control over war materiel exports."

But war materiel exports are not a playhouse. They are serious.

In the bill submitted to Parliament by the government--signed, to be sure, not by Minister of Defense Anders Thunborg but by Minister of Trade Mats Hellstrom--there is a strong argument, as there was in 1981, against the proposal:

"Of course, the establishment of an advisory committee must not mean that a new agency is being created alongside the Foreign Relations Committee to perform the same function as the latter where war materiel exports are concerned. Instead, in my (Hellstrom's) opinion, the appearance of an advisory committee can mean, for one thing, that the scope of matters that ought to be made the subject of broader consultation will be expanded, and, for another, that the Foreign Relations Committee can be relieved of certain duties for which it is currently responsible." Later in the same bill, however, the same Hellstrom writes:

"Considering that the board, in my opinion, should be at liberty to suggest that matters be made the subject of discussion with the Foreign Relations Committee, it is also possible that discussions by an advisory committee will lead to a review by that committee of matters which normally would not be taken up by the Foreign Relations Committee."

There is also Hellstrom's insinuation that the war materiel export advisory committee--or whatever it may turn out to be called--should include representatives only of parties represented on the Foreign Relations Committee. In fact, "a degree of personal association with the Foreign Relations Committee's members might be natural."

In essence, it can be said that nothing will change as a result of the proposal to form an advisory committee on war materiel exports.

The seriousness with which the government actually views its own proposal can be seen from the fact that it sees no need to provide the committee with a secretariat or with funds.

"There is no need for additional personnel within the War Materiel Inspectorate to handle extra work in the form of notices of meetings, increased consultation, and so on."

And the government's ultimate responsibility for war materiel exports, as established by current legislation, can naturally not be changed.

Nevertheless, Ambassador Theorin has scored a complete victory, because she and those sharing her view of reality can be pleased at being able to take a step forward while the government thinks it is meeting her halfway by taking a step sideways. This time it was an advisory committee, and everything is now ready for the next step.

If Ambassador Theorin is laughing up her sleeve at the prime minister, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of trade, and all the other cabinet members--with or without principles--one can understand why she is.

11798

CSO: 3650/81

OECD SEES INFLATION DROP, UNEMPLOYMENT RISE IN 1985

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 21 Dec 84 p 7

/Text/ Paris, (APE) /Athens News Agency/--OECD estimates for developments in the Greek economy for 1985 include an increase in the GNP by 2.25 percent, a small slowdown in the inflation rate, a continuation of the real increase of lower incomes --but also an upward turn in unemployment -- and a small drop in the current balance of trade. The above figures are based on data provided by the Greek Government. The OECD does not possess its own data.

In the organization's 6-month report on economic prospects of member countries, a report that was issued and commented on in Paris, the chapter on Greece reports positive developments in the basic indicators of the economy.

After a constant drop for 2 years, a 1.25 percent increase in the formation of fixed capital at firm prices is anticipated. A 2.75 percent increase in industrial production is also anticipated, compared to 1.25 percent in 1984. The increase in the GNP will continue at the same rate as 1984 --2.25 percent-- with basic factors being exports, consumption and investments by the public sector. On the other hand, private investments could remain weak due to the uncertain atmosphere prevailing in companies.

The OECD report mentions that income policy showed a 2 percent increase in average work pay in firm prices and that it was expected that the income policy would continue to favor the lower income categories with a strong tendency in consumption.

It is also expected that due to continuing cutbacks in agricultural employment and inflexibility in the labor market, unemployment --that reached 8 percent of the working population in July-- will continue with a slow upward turn.

The slowdown in the inflation rate, from 20.2 percent in 1983 to 18.5 percent in 1984, will continue to drop to 17.25 percent in 1985 due to price controls and to controls on other cost factors.

It is also expected that the deficit of the current balance of trade will diminish to slightly less than 2 billion dollars due primarily to the continued increase of revenues from tourism and a new improvement in the trade balance with the exception of petroleum.

Moreover, as far as exports are concerned, the OECD foresees a further slowdown in their increase for 1985. Thus, while exports had increased by 9.8 percent in 1983 compared to 1982 and 8 percent in 1984 compared to 1983, it is expected that the increase in 1985 will be 5 percent compared to 1984. A smaller increase in imports is also expected for 1985 (2.75 percent) compared to 3 percent recorded in 1984.

The increase in home consumption is also expected to continue. From 1.25 percent estimated for 1984 compared to 1983, home consumption is expected to increase by 1.5 percent during 1985.

Finally, the OECD notes that the deficit in the public sector that represents 10 percent of the GNP but in reality goes up to 13 percent will actually increase even more in 1985.

5671

CSO: 3521/112

MORE ELECTRICITY, LESS TOTAL ENERGY CONSUMED

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 28 Nov 84 p 11

[Article by Walter Fremuth: "Great Increase in this Year's Consumption of Power; Domestic Resources Ease Trade Balance"]

[Text] Even though we have been quite successful in loosening the link somewhat between economic growth and overall energy consumption, power consumption continues to climb. This is true not because the electric industry is making a massive push for greater power consumption — just the opposite was and remains the case — but because electric power is the form of energy which, if used rationally, can help to lower overall energy consumption. This has a positive effect not only on the trade balance, but also for the environment.

The prognosis already made in the spring by the Verbundgesellschaft that this year's consumption of power would grow by 4 to 4.5 percent was anything but overestimated. After 10 months, the growth in consumption was nearly 6 percent, and by year's end the rate will probably decline only slightly to about 5 percent. Following three years of somewhat weak growth rates (1.5 percent in 1981, 1.7 the following year, and 1.5 percent last year), the growth rate in power consumption has apparently returned, along with the revival of the economy, to the expected long-term trend. The electric industry's growth prognosis, which forms the basis of the coordinated expansion program, gives a figure of 3.1 percent annually for the coming 10-year period. This year's growth rate, which is nearly twice as great, is no reason to revise this prognosis upwards. The deviation from the 1.75 to 2.1 percent annual growth in power consumption as projected by the federal government's energy report is likewise not as great as it may appear at first glance. The prognosis was made for a 22-year time period, and even in the energy report one might by all means assume that growth rates somewhat higher than the average would be realistic for the initial years of the period covered by the prognosis.

In practice, what does a roughly 5 percent increase in power consumption signify? In terms of absolute figures, the additional consumption is equal to about 2 billion kilowatt-hours. That is just about as much as the planned Hainburg power plant, the most powerful station on the Danube, is able to produce during a normal year.

Unfortunately, "energy consumption" and "power consumption" are always being confused. While overall energy consumption -- a welcome sign -- has indeed declined, by 4.2 percent in 1982 as against 1981 and by 2.3 percent in 1983 as against 1982, power consumption during both of those years increased -- by 1.7 percent in 1982 and 1.5 percent last year. Thus, even during the recession it proved to be true that substitution efforts in favor of electric power were occurring and that there existed a need to catch-up in comparison with highly developed industrial nations. More and more power is therefore required per unit of real gross domestic product, but less energy on a whole. The divergent trend in energy and power consumption becomes clear, among other things, if one examines economic developments during the entire period from 1973 to 1983; during this period, real gross domestic product grew by 26 percent, and power consumption grew by 31 percent. In contrast, overall energy consumption declined by 2 percent. The latest data confirm these observations -- electric power is the form of energy whose increased use, in conjunction with modern technology, can help to decrease total energy consumption.

What really is the situation in regard to Austria's legendary surplus of power?

First, the general theory: Austria is in the fortuitous situation of being able to meet about 70 percent of its power requirements from hydropower. Many other countries envy us because of this situation. Yet, water also has its difficulties: We are dependent on the weather. In the summer, the water supplied by our rivers, and especially by the Danube, which forms the backbone of the Austrian base-load supply, is at its most plentiful -- consumption, however, is relatively low. In winter the situation is just the opposite: less water, but higher power consumption.

What now?

It is common knowledge that power is hard to store. Should we therefore just let the excess water run unused over the dam in the summertime?

Or can power be stored after all?

Yes, it can! Specifically, by means of exchange agreements with other countries. During the summer, we supply hydroelectric power to our neighboring countries. During this time they can leave their more costly thermal power plants idle or conduct inspections. Then in winter, we get the power back again, but in a certain ratio. For it is of course obvious to all that a "cheap" kilowatt-hour of hydroelectric summer power cannot be exchanged in equal amount for an "expensive" kilowatt-hour of thermal winter power. For this reason, the exchange is made for the benefit of both partners -- the profits are split. We, moreover, save even more on thermal reserve capacity.

Power Exchanges Enhance Security of Supply

Most of the kilowatt-hours flowing through Austria's lines is from the exchange of power. An intelligent thing to do -- and one that also enhances the security of supply in the partner nations: we are able to assist each

other when somebody's in trouble. On top of all this, however, even more power is sent out of our country. The reason is that many storage power plants, especially in the western part of our country, were built with financial assistance from German suppliers of electricity, which in exchange now receive the urgently needed peak energy. Likewise, a reasonable thing to do -- the kilowatt-hours of stored power are a very valuable form of energy, which is correspondingly reflected in its price. As a result of all this, in the past few years we exported more kilowatt-hours than we needed to import. Austria as an exporter of electric power? A short-circuited conclusion!

For if one sets up a realistic balance sheet for trade in electric power, then of course those fuel supplies must be included which we need to buy abroad in order to produce power in our thermal power plants. If such a balance is made, we are still "in the red" for our trade in electric power, in other words, we have a deficit.

The balance has become worse and worse in recent years. Though the ratio between imported and exported kilowatt-hours was still 1:4.1 in 1979, this ratio had sunk to only 1:1.9 by 1983! This year, poor water supplies are combined with a great increase in consumption, so that the ratio will continue to decrease towards the 1:1 mark. During the first 3 quarters of 1984, imports had to be increased by nearly 50 percent compared to the comparable period in the previous year, while at the same time exports had to be reduced by about a fifth. A gloomy computation considering the fact that in 1983 we were compelled to spend no less than 48 billion schillings for imports of energy and expect an even somewhat higher bill for this year.

To summarize: we have enough electric power. For us to be able to say that in four or five years, however, it will be necessary to put the expansion program into practice. Only by increasing our reliance on domestic resources can we help to ease the burden on the trade balance. Oil, coal, and even domestic gas are running short. The expansion of hydropower is Austria's chance to obtain environmentally compatible, secure domestic energy supplies for the future.

12412

CSO: 3620/174

MINISTER CONCEDES NUCLEAR POWER FOR COUNTRY IS DEAD ISSUE

Report Seen Premature

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Nov 84 p 8

[Editorial: "Ministerial Haste"]

[Text] Environmental Affairs Minister Christian Christensen has announced that nuclear energy will not be coming to Denmark in the foreseeable future and that therefore the Planning Board no longer has any basis for reserving the 15 sites around the country that could be the home for future nuclear power plants. The minister said this before the Radical Liberal motion to remove nuclear energy from Danish energy planning received final approval. And also before the government presentation of the study on the economics of nuclear energy compared to coal power--and before the government issues its new energy report. All these contributions to a political clarification will probably be ready within a few weeks. To sum it up briefly the minister was in quite a rush. And on a far-reaching matter at that.

Of course one must concede that the minister is correct in thinking that the clarifications referred to are unlikely to change the current political realities. As Professor Morten Lange said, "At their congress the Social Democrats agreed on the risk of nuclear power with the same convincing treatment of the issues as when Erasmus Montanus had to declare that the earth is flat." In passing, it should be said that it does not seem to have made any impression that so far more people have died in natural gas accidents than in nuclear power accidents. Nor does it change their position that the Swedes revealed by way of consolation that even with the sharply increased plant expenses nuclear power is still the cheapest form of energy. Therefore Denmark will go on living with the somewhat hollow double standard that we renounce nuclear power but see nothing wrong with the country being a large-scale consumer of imported electricity from the nuclear power plant in Barsebaek.

However the political attitude toward nuclear power could change. In another era which does not have to be far off but is actually already on the way, technological developments could establish the safety and cheapness of nuclear power--in addition to its guaranteed delivery. Until then we will have to

live with the pollution that oil and especially coal emit into the atmosphere. This will lead to demands for filtering out not only sulphur but also nitrous oxide and carbon dioxide. And in that case the country's energy supply will become so expensive that energy-intensive industries will have serious problems. But if the immediate considerations of job security prevent us from taking the consequences of this so that pollution of the air continues, there could well arise a popular demand even among the easily-swayed "greens" to change over to the cleanest and least environmentally damaging of all energy forms. Namely nuclear power, since there will never be reasonably economical costs for wind power or other romantic alternatives.

Therefore the environmental affairs minister should not close the door; on the contrary he should hold it open for nuclear power in another era, when the people want it. And consequently, in order to safeguard our options, we should hold onto a number of suitable locations for the construction of future power plants. It would have been wiser and more suitable if the environmental affairs minister had stressed this future consideration rather than hastening to placate short-sighted political moods.

Safety Concerns Paramount

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 30 Nov 84 p 2

[Text] Even though a report from the Energy Ministry says that Denmark can save 6-7 billion kroner on each nuclear power plant that is built instead of a coal-fired plant this does not change a Folketing majority's rejection of nuclear energy.

"A Folketing majority rejected nuclear power on the grounds of safety, not because of financial considerations, so the report is of no interest," said Social Democratic energy spokesman Ole Lovig Simonsen.

Coal Seen Economically Preferable

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 7-13 Dec 84 p 2

[Article by John Wagner]

[Text] Energy Minister Knud Enggaard has published a lengthy report that states that electricity produced from coal with sulphur removed from the gases would be about a third more expensive than electricity produced on the basis of uranium. But that makes no difference to the fact that Prime Minister Poul Schluter rejected the idea of nuclear power plants in Denmark in this century some time back and that the government--in agreement with the Folketing majority--has dropped any idea of nuclear power in the prime minister's opening address and in the so-called legislative catalogs. Here our correspondent,

John Wagner, who was political correspondent for JYLLANDS-POSTEN until May, tells the story of Poul Schluter's rejection of nuclear power, which came as a big surprise but in time to influence the results of the January election.

Government Rejects Nuclear Plants in This Century

It was on Friday, 6 January, 4 days before the Folketing election almost a year ago that Prime Minister Poul Schluter and the four-party government insured their re-election and the Conservative Party clinched a gain from 26 to 42 seats.

It was late morning in the prime minister's offices on the second floor of Christiansborg. The minister's secretary had already been in once to say that time was running out, that the prime minister had another appointment in a few minutes. But we just wanted to ask a few more questions about how Denmark would look 4 years from now if Poul Schluter got his way.

The prime minister readily answered questions about whether the budget deficit, the balance of payments deficit, interest rates, inflation and unemployment would rise or fall. Then I asked him if we would be building the first nuclear power plant in Denmark 4 years from now. The answer was:

"Naturally we will wait for the experts' evaluation, but there are many indications that it can no longer pay to build nuclear power plants in Denmark. This means we will also avoid the undoubtedly very violent controversy that such a decision and a popular referendum on it would provoke."

This is the background. Four days before the election the prime minister felt a need to soothe all the voters who were concerned about the safety and waste disposal problems connected with nuclear power plants.

"There are many indications that the time when it was relevant to consider building such plants in Denmark is past," said Poul Schluter who continued:

"If we had introduced nuclear power 10 or 20 years ago it would probably have paid off handsomely. But now it could be a very costly project and a poor national investment when we take the alternatives into consideration, for example oil and gas from the North Sea and the development of new forms of energy."

That was the lead story on the first page of JYLLANDS-POSTEN the next day. Radio and TV news programs followed up on the story. Party colleagues expressed themselves in diplomatic terms. Liberal politicians expressed surprise. The Social Democrats were glad. SF [Socialist People's Party] members were amazed and doubted that it could be true. The Organization to Inform the Public on Nuclear Power, OOA, rejoiced while Real Energy Information, REO, would not face the fact that Poul Schluter had said what he did.

But the prime minister had said goodbye to nuclear power plants in Denmark in this century--and perhaps for all time.

Legislation?

It may well be that some nonsocialist politicians still believe that legislation on building nuclear power plants in Denmark is in sight and that a popular referendum on the issue could be carried out in the late 1980's so that the first nuclear power plant could be dedicated at the end of the 1990's--if, that is, the voters confirm a plant construction bill that has been passed by Folketing.

But at Christiansborg there is broad agreement that the time is not ripe to make any decision along those lines. On the contrary, one might say. Energy Minister Knud Enggaard told the weekend edition of BERLINGSKE AFTEN:

"Today we have to realize that a majority opposes the construction of nuclear power plants. And anyway it was never our intention to present a proposal concerning such construction. It is clearly apparent in the report on conditions of importance to the production of electricity on the basis of coal and uranium that I sent to Folketing last week that it will be at a later date than previously predicted that it would be economically preferable to include pure electricity-producing units of this size in our energy supply system. That means there is no rush to present a bill in the next few years. Thus we now have plenty of time to discuss these questions in an extremely relaxed atmosphere. This is good from an objective point of view--but it is also an expression of the political realities that were evident several months ago."

Knud Enggaard was referring not only to the prime minister's campaign statement but also to the Social Democratic congressional statement that "nuclear power with the present technology should be removed from energy planning in Denmark," as the party's working program says.

Conclusion

The report on electricity production based on coal and uranium which the energy minister sent to the Folketing Energy Policy Committee last week concludes:

Not until around the year 2000 will there be a need for new power plants of such dimensions that nuclear power could be phased in naturally in the Danish electricity system. If electricity consumption grows as predicted, five nuclear power plants of 900 megawatts each could be incorporated in the Danish electricity system from around 2000 to 2025.

There is an economic advantage involved in producing electricity on the basis of uranium rather than on coal since electricity produced from coal with the need to remove sulphur from smoke emissions would cost about a third more than electricity produced from uranium. Expressed as a capital value in 1995, at 1984 price levels, the economic advantage of nuclear plants compared to coal-fired plants where sulphur is removed from the smoke would probably be somewhere around 6-7 billion kroner for each nuclear power plant.

A nuclear expansion (with five nuclear power plants) would mean that the total annual cost for the electricity system would rise by 2-4 billion kroner in a few years and would then be 3-6 billion kroner lower in relation to an expansion base on coal alone.

In the long-range perspective the reliability of supply is good for both coal and uranium, although it is felt that there is less uncertainty with regard to coal than there would be with uranium. It is felt that guarantees against sudden breaks in delivery would be enhanced if electricity is produced in a combination of nuclear and coal-fired plants, since vulnerability to supply shortages or sharp fuel price increases would be reduced with the use of two types of fuel. In this context it is worth noting that nuclear fuel can be stored much more cheaply than corresponding amounts of coal.

Will Not Persist

With the report in mind we asked the energy minister if he agreed with the prime minister that "there are many indications that the time is past when the question of building nuclear power plants in Denmark was relevant." Knud Enggaard replied:

"Yes, on the basis of a political evaluation. It cannot be denied that in a few years it will be economically advantageous to build a number of plants. But it has been known for some time that such a decision cannot win the support of a political majority. That was probably what lay behind the prime minister's statements during the campaign. This was confirmed at the Social Democratic congress. So I see no reason for the government to persist."

But others do. There are motions coming up in Folketing from both the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals that energy planning should be carried out without considering nuclear power, which means among other things that 15 site options would be released. Such a proposal could get the support of the Socialist People's Party and the Left-Socialist Party, which would provide a Folketing majority.

Under any circumstances, the Social Democratic-Liberal government agreed in August 1979 and Folketing went along with them that if Folketing voted in favor of nuclear power as a source of energy in Denmark this would have to be confirmed by the voters in a popular referendum before the first plant can be built.

Opinion polls in the spring showed that between half and two-thirds of the voters are opposed to nuclear power.

Minister: Parliament Against Nuclear Power

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Dec 84 p 15

[Article by Environmental Affairs Minister Christian Christensen]

[Text] It is fairly certain that Folketing will now remove nuclear power from our energy plans. The Radical Liberal proposal takes the consequences of this decision: We must start releasing the sites that were reserved earlier for nuclear power plants.

The Social Democrats have borrowed freely from the Radical proposal and also propose the release of these reserved sites.

Those are the realities. And we have begun to prepare ourselves for them in the Ministry of Environmental Affairs.

Therefore BERLINGSKE TIDENDE addressed the wrong people with its criticism that the decision was too hasty (23 November).

If Folketing decides that we should let the reserved sites go, I cannot ignore the decision even if I think it is wrong and feel that Folketing acted too hastily.

The Social Democrats are proposing that I report to Folketing if society can use the sites for other purposes than nuclear power and if so, outline what these purposes might be.

It is reasonable to see if this is the case. But one must remember that the intention was to insure the opportunities of locating nuclear power plants on those sites, a very specific purpose.

It is also important for the government to keep in close contact with the municipalities on this matter. We must arrive at a final solution in close cooperation with the municipalities.

One detail is worth bearing in mind. If the people and Folketing change their minds sometime in the future, so that we get nuclear power anyway, it is not certain that the sites selected will be the most appropriate at that time. Technological developments could very well raise new or different demands for the location of the plants.

As BERLINGSKE TIDENDE's readers undoubtedly know I think that nuclear power is an excellent way of solving our energy problems. Primarily because it puts less of a burden on the environment than most other forms of energy.

Now nuclear power seems to have been relegated to an uncertain future and a Folketing majority wants nuclear power removed from energy planning, regardless of what the energy minister's report on the economic aspect shows. So

now we must find other ways of solving the problems of providing our society with enough energy.

In this effort it is important not to forget for a minute that environmental policy and energy policy are inextricably connected. What we do in the energy sector cannot fail to affect our environment.

Therefore environmental factors are among the most important things we must consider in the very first deliberations on energy policy solutions.

6578

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COUNTRY EXPECTED TO GET FOURTH OF ENERGY NEEDS FROM NORTH SEA

Declining Consumption Positive Factor

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Dec 84 p 12

[Article by Dan Axél: "In a Few Years a Quarter of the Energy Will Come from the North Sea"]

[Text] The increasing self-supply will mean an improvement of the Danish balance of payments by 30 billion kroner the next four years.

Oil and gas from the North Sea today cover 15 percent of total Danish energy consumption, and this coverage will increase to a quarter of consumption over the course of a couple of years--when gas production reaches full capacity.

This comes from a new energy policy report from Energy Minister Knud Enggaard (Liberal Party), who is at the same time able to report that oil and gas activity in the Danish subsoil from 1984 to 1988 will improve the balance of payments by not less than 30 billion kroner.

He estimates this because increasing Danish oil and gas production are reducing Danish demand for the importation of equivalent energy.

In addition to the improvement in the balance of payments, the minister thinks that the State will gain revenues in the form of royalties and pipeline fees to the tune of 640 million kroner in 1985, increasing to about 900 million kroner in 1988.

But it is not only the development of traditional energy sources which will enjoy progress, Knud Enggaard believes. In his report he plans for /special priority/ [in italics] to be given to straw, surplus heat, waste and wood--together with natural gas--over oil and coal when a position is to be taken for the future on what district heating plants will use for fuel.

At the same time the energy minister is making much out of maintaining that energy is still to be conserved in Denmark. He ascribes to increasing activity in the community the 3-percent increase in energy consumption in 1984 as compared with the year before.

Seen over many years, energy consumption in Denmark has dropped strongly, from what corresponds to 20.4 million tons of oil in 1979 to what today is equivalent to 17.1 million tons. And just oil's share of total energy consumption has dropped from 92 percent in 1973 to 59 percent last year.

Nuclear power is not mentioned in the energy minister's report in connection with Denmark's future electricity supply. Here the minister's message is that there "for many years to come will be a need for just a limited expansion of electricity production capacity." Knud Enggaard suggests that this expansion be covered by better service for our neighboring countries--especially Sweden and Norway--and improved utilization of the combined electricity supply system.

Full Production Expected Soon

Copenhagen AKTUEL in Danish 16 Dec 84 p 18

[Article by Vagn Petersen: "The North Sea's 'Black Gold' Will Soon Turn the Danish Energy Picture Upside Down: Now the Oil Venture is Booming Out There"]

[Text] Denmark has seriously begun to score a win in the oil venture in the North Sea.

This year 20 percent--or one fifth--of our total consumption of oil and gas will be drawn from the Danish part of the North Sea. The North Sea is today covering 15 percent of our total energy consumption.

And the venture has only just begun. In the course of a couple of years the present production in the North Sea will turn the Danish energy picture completely upside down.

When the Tyra field reaches full gas production in 1987, over half--precisely, 53 percent--of our total consumption of oil and gas will come from the DUC [Danish Subsoil Consortium] fields in the North Sea.

At the same time this means that about one third of our total energy consumption will be covered via the North Sea.

The oil and gas will also leave their considerable mark on the distressed balance of payments. It is expected that the North Sea activities in the next three years will improve the balance of payments by close to 30 billion kroner.

Added to this is the fact that the State treasury will be ensured as soon as next year handsome revenues of 640 million kroner in the form of so-called royalties and pipeline fees. These revenues are expected to increase to almost a billion kroner before 1988.

The present estimate of the development of Danish oil and gas production is based exclusively on the activities which the former holder of the exclusive rights, A.P. Møller, has under way in cooperation with the Danish Subsoil Consortium.

This year DUC will attain the production of 2.2 million tons of oil in the attractive Central Trough area a few hundred kilometers out in the North Sea. Production will increase smoothly in the years to come to reach a temporary culmination in 1987 of over three million tons on an annual basis.

The same year gas production will reach a peak of 2.5 billion cubic meters from the Tyra field. Thereby Danish oil and gas production will reach a level which no one dared to dream of only 10 years ago.

It is precisely DUC's successful oil hunt which makes it difficult to assess how the situation will look before the end of the 80's. At the same time as the production of oil and gas culminates, the many new "oil hunters" in the Danish subsoil, that is to say, will realize whether they have come upon oil in such great occurrences that it can pay to produce it.

Accordingly, the increased research activity will to a large extent be decisive for whether Denmark has a future in the exclusive ranks of oil-producing countries.

8985

CSO: 3613/48

BRIEFS

NEW NATURAL GAS MONOPOLY--The new independent natural gas company with the name of Dansk Naturgas [Danish Natural Gas] was founded at an extraordinary general meeting of DONG [Danish Oil and Natural Gas]. The new company is taking over retroactively as of 1 October all assets and liabilities of the natural gas project. [Excerpt] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Dec 84 Sect III p 1] 8985

CSO: 3613/48

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